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APOLLO EXPERIENCE REPORT 
GU I DANCE AND CONTROL SYSTEMS: 
LUNAR MODULE ABORT GUIDANCE SYSTEM 
B y  Pat M. Kur ten 
Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center 
SUMMARY 
With respect  to the lunar module abort  guidance system, the Apollo Program 
experience included the full range of program development f rom requirements through 
design, development, and production and culminated with successful flight. A s  a 
resul t  of preliminary lunar-abort concepts, a strapped-down inertial-sensor package 
for attitude reference and an open-loop programer were selected to provide ascent 
steering for  lunar-orbit insertion. A c lear  pericynthion orbit could be obtained by 
postinsertion burns, and rendezvous was  to  be accomplished by means of external 
information. A program redefinition in 1964 added the requirement for  a clear peri-  
cynthion orbit f rom the initial abort burn and the requirement for a rendezvous within 
the lunar module fuel budget without information from sources  outside the lunar 
module. The required accuracy of the strapped-down package was therefore increased, 
and a general-purpose digital computer containing 4096 words of memory replaced the 
open-loop programer.  A display and keyboard device was added for crew communica- 
tions with the computer. 
INTRODUCTION 
The lunar module (LM) abort  guidance system (AGS) represents  the first opera- 
tional usage of a strapped-down guidance system. The AGS was designed and developed 
specifically for  application in the Apollo LM. The AGS is composed of a strapped-down 
(or fixed) inertial-sensor package, the abort  sensor assembly (ASA); a general-purpose 
digital computer with specialized input/output, the abort electronics assembly (AEA); 
and a display and keyboard device fo r  crew communication with the computer, the data  
entry and display assembly (DEDA). The AGS forms the digital portion of a hybrid 
digital/analog guidance and control system and is configured to provide automatic con- 
t ro l  for  mission abort  resulting from a pr imary guidance system (PGS) malfunction. 
The AGS was supplied by the LM prime contractor under NASA cognizance at the 
NASA Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center (JSC) (formerly the Manned Spacecraft Center 
(MSC)). The E ~ C ~ P I I ?  respnnsihilit-y nf the AGS was subcontracted. The ASA was 
fur ther  subcontracted by the subcontractor to  the ASA vendor. The software for  the 
AEA was contracted by MSC directly to the subcontractor. 
A s  an aid to the reader ,  where necessary the original units of measure have been 
converted to the equivalent value in the Systzme International d'Unit6s (SI). The SI 
units a r e  written f i rs t ,  and the original units are written parenthetically thereafter. 
ACRONYMS 
ACE 
AEA 
AGS 
ASA 
BPA 
C&W 
CARR 
CDH 
CDU 
CES 
CM 
c SI 
CSM 
DEDA 
DMCP 
DR 
DTO 
DVT 
EL 
EM1 
2 
acceptance checkout equipment 
abort  electronics assembly 
abort guidance system 
abort  sensor assembly 
Bethpage, New York 
caution and warning 
customer acceptance readiness review 
constant differential height 
coupling data  unit 
contr ol electronics system 
command module 
coelliptic sequence initiate 
command and service module 
data entry and display assembly 
design mission computer program 
design report  
detailed test objective 
design verification test 
electroluminescent 
electromagnetic interference 
E PC 
FACI 
FE B 
FMES 
FRR 
FS 
GSE 
HSSC 
HVSUt 
IA 
ICs 
IFC 
JSC 
KSC 
LM 
LOS 
LSC 
MSC 
MSOB 
OA 
PERT 
PIC 
PGNCS 
PGS 
PT SA 
Ear th  prelaunch calibration 
fir st article configuration in spec tion 
functional electronic block 
f u l l  mission engineering simulation 
flight readiness review 
flight simulator 
ground - support equipment 
Hamilton Standard System Center 
H-vector spin input rectification 
input axis 
interpretive computer simulation 
in-flight calibration 
Lyndon B. Johnson Space Center 
John F. Kennedy Space Center 
lunar module 
line of sight 
lunar surface calibration 
Manned Spacecraft Center 
Manned Spacecraft Operations Building 
output axis 
program evaluation reporting technique 
preinstallation calibration 
pr imary guidance, navigation, and control system 
primary guidance system 
pulse torquing servoamplifier 
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RCS reaction control system 
RTV room-temperature vulcanizing 
SA spin axis 
SI Syst5me International d'Unit6s 
T PI terminal phase initiate 
D I SCUSS I ON 
Prel iminary LM Abort Concepts 
The preliminary LM abort concepts included definition of ear ly  requirements and 
preliminary mechanization. 
Early requirements. - The AGS was developed to provide the capability for  safe 
crew abort f rom the powered descent, lunar surface, and powered ascent phases of the 
lunar mission. During these critical mission phases, information cannot be obtained 
from the command module (CM) o r  Earth that will ensure crew safety after failure of 
the primary guidance, navigation, and control system (PGNCS). The ground rules  that 
defined the preliminary concepts of the AGS hardware are as follows. 
1. Crew safety is primary. This ground rule implies that mission abort  will be 
initiated if one additional failure will cause loss  of crewmen. On a vehicle having a 
PGS and an AGS, failure of either will resul t  in an abort  because one additional guid- 
ance failure will not allow safe rendezvous with the CM. 
2. Abort capability must exist at all t imes  in case  of a single PGS failure. The 
capability t o  initiate an abort must be independent of the LM phasing with the command 
and service module (CSM). The AGS must be capable of coping with initial conditions 
at any instant during powered descent and ascent. The capability of launching from the 
lunar surface at any t ime must exist. 
3.  The AGS must have independent operation. The AGS should be designed to 
operate without dependence on the PGS during cr i t ical  mission phases. 
4. The AGS should be simple. The system should be able to abort  to  a clear 
pericynthion of 12 192 meters  (40 000 feet) at initial injection o r  at a la ter  correction 
if no additional hardware is required fo r  the later correction. The CSM, through a 
communication link to the LM, will be used to provide the LM with information for  
performing midcourse corrections. Rendezvous from abort  should be completed within 
the LM fuel capacity. 
5. An all-attitude inertial  reference should be provided in the AGS. This 
requirement was established to ensure a reference if the three-gimbaled PGS should 
encounter gimbal lock. 
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6. The AGS need not be designed to complete the lunar landing mission. This  
rule does not imply that there is not some point in.time when the LM will land with a 
PGS failure . 
7.  The AGS should have the capability of using both the ascent and descent stages 
of the LM. This  provision was made to  use the fuel in the descent stage as well as in 
the ascent stage after an abort. 
Modification of the preceding ground rules w a s  considered to enable the use of a 
simpler attitude reference system, such as a pair of gyros having two degrees  of free- 
dom. The requirement for  the LM to complete the rendezvous with onboard fuel would 
be modified to have the LM establish itself in a clear pericynthion orbit  in the plane of 
the CSM orbit. The requirement for  the LM to abort to  a clear orbit  would be modified 
to put the LM on an intercept path with the CSM. These modifications to the ground 
ru les  were examined and discarded, primarily because of the increased fuel usage with 
an inaccurate system, the increased burden on CSM activity, and the unsafe t ra jector ies  
involved. 
Preliminary mechanization. - The ground rule requiring LM abort  to a c lear  
pericynthion orbit and requiring onboard fuel to complete rendezvous made an inertial- 
quality attitude reference system a necessity. A four-gimbaled inertial  platform and 
a strapped-down attitude reference were considered. The strapped-down inertial  
reference was  selected. The development r i sks  associated with a strapped-down 
system were outweighed by the mechanical simplicity, the inherent ruggedness, the 
ease of maintenance, and the potential of the strapped-down system as a lightweight, 
reliable system for  the LM abort mission and for future space applications. At  the 
t ime of evaluation, the weight of the strapped-down sensors  (gyros and accelerometers) 
was estimated at 7 kilograms (15 pounds); the associated electronics were estimated 
at 10.9 kilograms (24 pounds). 
An open-loop programer was  selected to provide the ascent steering necessary 
for  a clear lunar orbit. A programer with an  estimated weight of 9 kilograms 
(20 pounds) was  the least complex, proven device f o r  accomplishing this  function 
because AGS navigation was not required. The programer provided a vehicle pitch 
sequence based on time of abort  and stored constants and produced a thrust  cutoff signal 
based on the velocity output of an accelerometer mounted along the vehicle thrust axis. 
A compensation scheme was incorporated into the program to cor rec t  for  tolerances 
inherent in vehicle propulsion. The compensation scheme compared velocity readings 
from the thrust  axis accelerometer taken at specified t ime intervals with nominal 
velocity values fo r  adjusting pitch attitude and velocity at cutoff. Two accelerometers  
mounted normal  to the thrust  axis provided attitude biasing in correction of vehicle 
thrust  misalinement. (The system outputs were attitude e r r o r  signals for  controlling 
vehicle attitude, total-attitude signals for  display, and an engine-off signal. ) The 
programer was  envisioned as a 2048-word computer having a fixed memory. A control 
panel weighing approximately 4.5 kilograms (10 pounds) completed the preliminary 
mechanization concept. 
5 
Program Redefinition 
The following program redefinition was made concerning AGS requirements and 
mechanization. 
Requirements. - In the fall of 1964, a se r i e s  of LM program redefinition meetings 
was held biweekly to reconfigure the LM guidance and control systems, including the 
AGS. Several changes were made to the ground rules  covering the existing conceptual 
design. 
1. The AGS should be capable of performing rendezvous with the CM within the 
LM fuel budget without information from sources  outside the LM. 
2. The AGS should provide information for monitoring the PGS. 
3. The AGS should be capable of providing LM abort to the CSM from any phase 
of the LM mission. 
4. The AGS should be capable of inserting the LM into a clear  pericynthion 
orbit of 9144 meters  (30 000 feet) above the Moon. This  requirement originated 
because the height of some of the lunar mountains was determined to be 8839 meters  
(29 000 feet), although the mountains were not on the lunar equator, the landing site, 
o r  the lunar-orbit location. This  requirement also necessitated c lear  pericynthion on 
the first abort burn and thus increased the accuracy requirement of the inertial  
reference. 
5. The AGS attitude reference should be maintained a t  25 deg/sec angular 
rotation. This requirement was established because of the vehicle rates necessary for  
proper vehicle response to manual commands during the final phase of lunar landing. 
Mechanization. - Revision of the ground ru les  resulted in discarding the open-loop 
programer concept because of inflexibility and incapability. A general-purpose com- 
puter containing 4096 words was selected to replace the programer.  
Navigation capability was added to the software, and an explicit guidance law was 
selected to perform the rendezvous. A hard-line interface between the rendezvous 
radar  and the computer was added f o r  navigation updates. This interface was later 
changed to a manual interface because of a mechanization problem. 
A connection between the PGS digital telemetry downlink and the AGS computer 
was added t o  obtain state vector initialization information fo r  navigation; this addition 
augmented the existing alinement interface for  attitude reference alinement to the PGS. 
A digital telemetry downlink was added from the AEA. Added to the existing total- 
attitude and attitude e r r o r  displays were computer interfaces for  displaying altitude, 
altitude rate, and lateral velocity for  monitoring the PGS. 
The AGS therefore became a full guidance system. After alinement f rom the PGS 
with attitude information and after initialization with LM and CSM position, velocity, 
and epoch time data, the AGS continuously computes LM attitude, LM and CSM position 
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and velocity, and abort  t ra jector ies  fo r  predetermined orbital insertion conditions or  
for  orbital  t ransfers  to the CSM. The assemblies comprising the AGS are shown in 
figure 1. 
(b) Abort sensor  assembly. 
(a) Data entry and display assembly. 
System Description 
The devices comprising the AGS are 
the AEA, the DEDA, and the ASA. 
Abort electronics assembly. - The 
AEA is a general-purpose, high-speed 
digital computer that performs strapped- 
down attitude reference computations and 
navigation and guidance functions required 
to steer the LM to rendezvous. The AEA 
consists of a core  memory, control and 
arithmetic logic, input/output circuitry,  
and a power supply. The assembly weighs (c) Abort electronics assembly. 
14.8 kilograms (32 .7  pounds) and has  
dimensions of 60 .32  by 20 by 13 .33  centi- 
meters  (23 .75  bv 8 bv 5 .25  inches). The 
Figure 1. - Abort guidance system 
components. 
AEA (1) processes  input information from 
the ASA, the DEDA, and the PGS; (2) per-  
fo rms  attitude reference alinement and state vector initialization; (3) calibrates 
in-flight, iunar surface,  and acceierometer biases; (4) periorrns b e u - ~ e b ~ b ,  (3) I I I ~ I I -  
tains attitude reference;  (6) per forms navigation computations; (7) selects  mode; 
1,- L -  -I-. f r \  _ _ _ _  2.- 
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(8) performs guidance computations; (9) outputs steering and engine commands; 
(10) processes telemetry; and (11) displays outputs for  in-flight monitoring. 
Half of the 4096 words of memory in the AEA are hardwired and half are 
erasable.  Fifty-three escape points exist throughout the wired memory so that cor -  
rections can be made, as required, in softwired memory. The memory uses  
0.0008-meter (30 mil) ferrite cores  wired in 64 by 64 planes, one plane for  each word 
bit. The word length is 18 bits. Data words consist of a sign and 17 magnitude bits. 
Instructions consist of 18 bits that contain the order  code and a single operand address  
The memory is a coincident current,  parallel, random-access core memory with 
a cycle time of 5 microseconds. The functions located in the fixed memory are those 
that require the fastest computation o r  those that are mission independent (or both 
types); that is, direction cosine and tangent routines. Values that might feasibly vary 
from mission to  mission, such as the guidance equations and the radar  filter, are 
located in the erasable  memory. Computer computations are done in 20-millisecond, 
40-millisecond, and 2-second cycles. The direction cosine matrix is updated 50 t imes  
per  second; the attitude e r r o r  and engine commands are computed during the 
40-millisecond cycle; and navigation and guidance are computed during the 2-second 
cycle. 
The computer uses a fractional two's complement parallel arithmetic section. 
The computer add time is 10 microseconds; the multiply time, 70 microseconds. The 
AEA executes 27 basic instructions. The clock frequency is 1.024 megahertz. A 
50-word digital telemetry downlink is outputted from the AEA once per  second. 
Integrated circuits,  thin film networks, and multilayer circuit  boards are used 
extensively to minimize size and weight. Al l  subassemblies except the power supply 
a r e  packaged in groups of multilayer boards interconnected by a wiring matrix. Split- 
pin wire wrapping is used to connect the multilayer boards to the matrix. The matrix 
c a r r i e s  all  signal l ines between the core memory, the ari thmetic and control logic, 
and the input/output circuitry.  Power is distributed by laminated bus ba r s  encapsu- 
lated in the wiring matrix. The power supply modules a r e  of cordwood construction. 
The sideplates of the AEA are attached to cold rails on which the AEA is mounted in 
the LM aft equipment bay. The AEA dissipates 81 watts of power. 
Data entry and display assembly. - The DEDA is used to control AGS modes of 
operation, to inser t  data in the AEA manually, and to command the contents of acces- 
sible AEA memory to be displayed on numeric readouts. Manual control is accom- 
plished by depression of pushbuttons on the DEDA panel in the required sequence. The 
DEDA, AEA, and ASA external configurations are shown in figure 1. 
The DEDA consists of two main assemblies:  a control panel housing the electro- 
luminescent (EL) numeric display and the data-entry pushbuttons, and a logic enclosure 
housing the drive circuits,  the input/output circuits,  the power conditioning circuits,  
and the logic circuits.  The logic enclosure is a hermetically sealed assembly housing 
nine multilayer circuit  boards. The DEDA circui t ry  is composed of flatpacks and 
thin f i l m  networks. The DEDA has  access  to 452 of the 4096 memory locations in the 
AEA. Manual control is accomplished through the use of 4 pushbuttons f o r  "clear, " 
"readout, " "enter, " and "hold, " respectively; in addition, 10 pushbuttons fo r  the 
digits 0 to 9 and 2 pushbuttons for  ari thmetic signs are available. 
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The readout consists of an EL nine-window display. Three digits are used to 
display, in octal form,  the address  of the memory location into which information is 
to be inserted o r  from which information is to be extracted. Six digits, the first being 
the arithmetic sign, are used to display numeric information. Information t ransfer  
f rom the DEDA to the AEA is accomplished by means of a 36-bit serial digital word. 
Display parameters  f rom the AEA are updated twice per  second. The DEDA weighs 
3.4 kilograms (7.5 pounds); the dimensions a r e  14.0 by 15.2 by 13.18 centimeters 
(5.5 by 6 .0  by 5.19 inches). The operating power is 10 watts supplied by the AEA. 
The DEDA is mounted without cold rails in the LM cabin. 
Abort sensor  assembly. - The ASA is a strapped-down inertial-sensor unit 
mounted to  the LM structure and oriented with the coordinate reference axes along the 
vehicle axes. The ASA senses  and measures  accelerations along and angular rotations 
about the LM axes, converts these motions to discrete increments,  and t ransmits  
these increments in the form of pulses to the AEA for  processing. The ASA consists 
of three floated, pulse-rebalanced, single-degree-of -freedom, rate-integrating gyros; 
three pendulous, fluid-damped accelerometers  and associated pulse torquing electron- 
ics; a frequency countdown subassembly; coarse and fine temperature controller units; 
a power supply; and interface electronics. 
The ASA uses  current  pulse torquing to rebalance the output f rom the sensors.  
Vehicle motions detected by the sensors  a r e  converted to alternating-current voltages 
having a magnitude and a phase proportional to  the sensed motion. The output of each 
gyro is applied to a pulse torquing servoamplifier (PTSA) that quantizes the signals 
and provides output pulses to the AEA at 64 000 pulses/sec and to the sensor  for  torque 
rebalancing at 1 kilohertz. 
The gyros used in the ASA were specifically developed for  the strapped-down use. 
The accelerometers  used are 2401 accelerometers that replaced the Bell VII units 
because of contamination experienced with those units. The sensors  and their  asso-  
ciated electronics are mounted orthogonally on a beryllium block for  temperature con- 
t rol .  
two devices: a fast warmup control to  provide minimum timelag to  full operational 
capability and a fine temperature control to maintain the critical operating temperature 
of 322 K (120' F). Two sensors, placed mechanically in diagonal legs of a bridge, are 
used to detect temperature variations. 
Operating temperature is maintained by single-point control and is provided by 
Both gyros and accelerometers  operate on a torque-balance principle and use 
common pulse torque servoamplifiers. Time-modulated current  is used to offset input 
angular rates and accelerations by a forced limit-cycle pulse torquing system. Binary 
torquing using alternate positive- and negative-current periods ra ther  than discrete 
pulses provides a high angular information rate  and a low system switching rate. 
Pulses  f rom the pulse torque servoamplifiers to the AEA are quantized at 2-16 rad/ 
pulse for  the gyros and at 0.000952 m/sec/pulse (0.003125 ft/sec/pulse) for  the accel- 
e romete r s  and are supplied at a maximum ra te  of 64 000 pulses/sec. 
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The necessary mounting accuracy of the ASA is obtained mechanically within 
2 arc-minutes through four machined feet mounted to the LM navigation base outside 
and above the LM cabin. A side-mounted coldplate is used in the ASA for  heat 
removal. The ASA weighs 9 .4  kilograms (20.7 pounds) and has  dimensions of 
12.9 by 22.8 by 29.2 centimeters (5.1 by 9 .0  by 11.5 inches). The ASA power dissipa- 
tion is 74 watts. 
The ASA specification values for inertial performance used in the development of 
the ASA are given in table I. (See fig. 2 also.)  The ASA specification c r i te r ia  are aug- 
mented by parameter stability c r i te r ia  that are exclusively for  bench-test maintenance- 
equipment calibrations at  one facility. 
repeatability limit on the three readings used to determine a mean representing the 
parameter value for any one calibration run is also required for  a bench calibration. 
These limits are given in table 111. 
The tes t  l imits are given in table 11. A 
TABLE I. - ABORT SENSOR ASSEMBLY SPECIFICATION VALUES 
Gyro scale-factor error 
Gyro b t u  
Gyro lnput ax18 (IA) mass 
Gyro spin axla (Sa maes 
Unbala"Ce 
UnbahnCe 
Gyro Y-axis alinement 
Accelerometer Y-axis allnement 
Gyro Z-axis  alinement 
Accelerometer Z-urls ahernen1 
Gyro X-axla alinement 
Accelerometer X-axis allnement 
Gyro Z-ax18 alinement 
Accelerometer Z-aris allnement 
Gyro X-axis ahnement 
Accelerometer X-axis allnement 
Gyro Y-axis allnement 
Accelerometer Y - w s  allnement 
Accelerometer scale-factor err01 
Accelerometer bias discrepancy 
Accelerometer bias discrepancy 
Gyro blaa discrepancy 
lnput vcrtlcal minus 
output vertical 
spln vartlcal mlnus 
output vertlcal 
Output up minus 
output dawn 
scale-fador nonllnearlty 
Accelerometer acale-factor 
wallnearlty 
Gyro scale-factor asymmetry 
Accelerometer acale-factor 
ulgmmdry 
Charnel Trim value 
500 pulses/mln 
2.4 deg/hr 
2 . 4  deg/hr 
2 . 4  deg/hr 
4 deg/hr/g 
4 deg/hr/g 
130 are-sec 
250 arc-see 
250 arc-see 
250 arc-sec 
130 Z ~ E - B I C  
130 arc-see 
250 arc-sec 
250 arc-8ec 
130 arc-8ec 
130 are-sec 
130 arc-sec 
250 arc-sec 
L500 pulses/mln 
moug 
10Qllg 
_. 
. 2  deg/hr 
. 2  deg/hr 
. 35  d e g h r  
0 to 10 d e d s e c  
IO to 22 deglsec 
22 to 25 deg/sec 
1wvs 
(3 
2%0 
Trim stablllty 
10 
w 
CL - 200 
Because of the fixed nature of a 
strapped-down guidance system, complete 
calibrations requiring rotation cannot be 
performed in a vehicle. However, an Earth 
prelaunch calibration (EPC) program used 
in the AEA provides a determination of gyro 
drift when vehicle azimuth and latitude are 
known. In addition to  the specification 
requirement, the time- stability values of 
table IV were generated on the basis of the 
AGS estimated capability in flagging non- 
150 
% pulseslmin 
4 
50 
I , I , , , I , characterist ic EPC results.  
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 1 0  
Input rate, deglsec 
Figure 2. - Abort sensor assembly asym- 
metry requirements. 
TABLE n. - ABORT SENSOR ASSEMBLY TlME-STABILITY LIMITS 
Parameter 
Crro bhs 
Gyro scale factor 
(2.62 deg/see) 
Gyro spin mass unbalance 
Gyro input mass unbalance 
x gyroc 
Accelerometer bias. IA 
Accelerometer scale factor 
Accelerometer misalinemei 
CtlaMel symbol unit 
0 to 2 
0.35 
I60 
. 36 
. 30 
- _  30 
. 2 5  
46 
-w 
46 
- 
2 to 6 
0.48 
I95 
.44 
35 
-.48 
.35 
46 
e140 
e- 110 
46 
- 
i to IO 
0. 54 
240 
. 5: 
.4! 
-. 5' 
.4! 
46 
e155 
-137 
46 
___ 
Limit on delta-mean for 
t ime mterval. days 
10 to 20 
0.60 
300 
. 66  
.64 
-. 66 
.64 
46 
e170 
e80 
e-192 
46 
!O to 40 
0.69 
300 
. 6 8  
.90 
-1.28 
.90 
46 
195 
80 
,280 
46 
'H88C = Hamilton Standard System Center. 
bBPA = Bethpage, New York (location of Crumrnan Aerospace Corporation), 
'Applies only dter BO days from seMor acceptance, 
dThe llmit of 46 can be increased to LBO d an output-axis (OA) apparent misalinement problem has been demonstrated to exIS1 
esmaller than acceptance test Limits. 
40 to 60 
0.66 
300 
1. 03 
1. IO 
-1 .63  
1 10 
46 
215 
80 
352 
46 
60 t o  90 
0.69 
300 
1.19 
1.35 
-2.01 
1. 35 
46 
240 
80 
-445 
46 
0 to 120 
0. 7 3  
300 
1. 30 
1. 56 
-2.39 
1. 56 
46 
264 
BO 
-506 
46 
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TABLE III. - ABORT SENSOR ASSEMBLY REPEATABILITY LIMITS 
~ 
ASA parameter 
Gyro bias 
Gyro scale factor  
(2.62 deg/sec) 
Gyro IA mass 
unbalance 
Gyro SA mass 
unbalance 
Gyro IA 
misalinement 
Accelerometer 
bias 
Accelerometer 
scale  factor 
Accelerometer IA 
misalinement 
Symbol 
G G  G 
BiI’ BiO’ BiS 
SG 
U; 
S 
‘i 
Y.. 
1J 
A 
BiI 
A 
BiO 
BiP 
SA 
A 
CY.. 
1J 
Unit 
deg/hr 
puls es/min 
deg/hr/g 
d eg/hr/g 
a rc-sec  
wg 
IJ.g 
Pg 
pulses/min 
a rc-sec  
Limit on 
delta -m easur  em ent s 
within a set  of 
3 calibrations 
0. 29 
112 
. 22  
. 30 
a25 
42  
76 
76 
22 
20 
Limit on standard 
leviation u from 
a set  of 
3 calibrations 
0. 17 
66 
. 13 
. 18 
15 
a 
25 
45 
45 
13 
12 
a The limit on u for  gyro misalinements y x z ,  yyx, and y can be increased zx 
to 106 arc-sec and the limit on delta-measurements to  180 arc-sec for a demonstrated 
OA apparent misalinem ent problem. 
1 2  
0 
Q, 
0 
0 
W 
0 
W 
0 
0 * 
0 * 
0 
0 
N 
0 cu 
0 
c, 
- 
Y 
- 
Y 
- 
Y 
0, 
z 
- 
0 
W 
Y 
- 
W 
0 
N 
Y 
- 
N 
0 
0 
c, 
0 
O N  a O N  a O N  a 
O N  a 
~ 
h 
u 
PI w 
PI w 
& 
d 
3 
0 
cd 
k 
cd 
0 
E 
0 
cd 
cd 
m 
E 
Q, 
.rl 
Y 
.-( 
.r( Y
d 
c., 
.rl 
f$ 
II a 
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Test Program 
The tes t  program for the AGS consisted of design feasibility and verification 
testing, qualification testing, spacecraft testing, full mission engineering simulation 
(FMES), certification tes t  requirements, and acceptance testing. 
Design feasibility and verification tes ts .  - Design feasibility tes t s  were incor- 
porated into the AGS program for  component and part  selection; for  investigation of the 
performance of breadboard models, components, and subassemblies under various 
environmental conditions; for selection of materials;  and for substantiation of safety 
margins and other analytical assumptions. The feasibility t e s t s  were conducted exclu- 
sively by the assembly vendor in support of design. Design verification tes t s  were 
included in the program to substantiate the correctness  of the assembly design for  the 
intended mission under simulated ground and flight environments and off-design 
conditions. 
Four assemblies were initially designated as reliability test models and assigned 
to design verification testing. Because the program schedule and cost considerations 
necessitated a reduction in hardware, only two assemblies were assigned to design 
verification testing. The first unit was assigned to cr i t ical  environments, electromag- 
netic interference (EMI), and overs t ress  testing. Crit ical  environments were to be 
selected by the vendor to ensure that the assembly would pass  the design-limit qualifi- 
cation test. During this  test ,  the environments were to be increased from mission 
levels to twice mission levels. The overs t ress  test was to be performed until failure 
and was to use launch o r  mission environments exclusively. Failure -mode prediction 
analysis was to be used in selecting the overs t ress  environments. The second design 
verification tes t  (DVT) unit was assigned exclusively to mission simulation in the order  
in which the environments were to be experienced. 
Program constraints, primarily schedule problems, resulted in cutting the DVT 
program to one assembly and restricting the tes t s  to  design-limit environmental levels. 
Preproduction units were used for  design verification testing, although the program 
goal was to use production hardware. The DVT environments for  the AGS a r e  given 
in table V. 
In addition to design verification testing, a series of design-proof tes ts  was per-  
formed on the AGS to evaluate interfaces, angular vibration, gyro scale-factor 
asymmetry, EPC (with and without sway), navigation in static and dynamic environ- 
ments, in-flight calibration (IFC), resonance (3 hertz), coning, constants polarity, 
and flight-configuration compatibility (test set compared to flight-configuration 
performance ). 
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TABLE V.- DESIGN VERIFICATION TESTING ENVIRONMENTS FOR THE AGS 
Environment 
Thermal vacuum 
Resonance search 
Temperature vibration 
Shock 
Temperatur e/humidity 
Acceleration 
Leak 
Corrosive contaminant 
Oxygen 
Vibration 
Gyro and accelerometer 
scale-factor linearity 
Gyro and accelerometer 
mechanical frequency 
response 
Angular vibration 
Frequency response 
Saturation and bottoming 
Calibration transients 
Magnetic field 
susceptibility 
4bort electronics 
assembly 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
Data entry and 
iisplay assembly 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
4bort sensor  
assembly 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
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Qualification. - Two production AGS units were assigned to qualification testing. 
The qualification program was originally divided into two phases, qualification and 
postqualification, with a teardown and inspection between the tests. 
The first qualification unit was assigned to simulate the mission environment. 
Ground environment tests were to be performed first, followed by two flight environ- 
ment simulations. The postqualification testing was to consist of two additional flight 
simulations. The second unit was assigned to design-limit testing and unique environ- 
ments, such as salt spray. The postqualification test for  this  unit was to be two 
overstress  tests. 
A ground rule of the test program was that the entire DVT program be completed 
before the beginning of qualification testing. 
design verification testing and qualification testing overlapped; this rule was modified 
for the AGS so that an environment was tested in design verification testing before the 
same environment was demonstrated in qualification testing. 
Because of schedule considerations, 
Program cost and schedule considerations resulted in the elimination of postquali- 
fication testing. The number of flight simulations was also reduced, and the exposures 
were lengthened accordingly because of the t ime for  setup and teardown of a tes t  and 
the potential damage resulting from the activity. 
In the endurance qualification, a 1000-hour burn-in before starting the environ- 
ment tests was established to simulate the assembly test and checkout period. Because 
of schedule constraints, this period was reduced to  250 hours, and EM1 testing was 
performed during the period. 
The AGS qualification history consisted of the following separate tes ts .  
1. ASA original qualification 
2. ASA accelerometer change qualification 
3. DEDA original qualification 
4.  DEDA modified E L  display mounting qualification 
5. AEA original qualification 
6. AEA modified internal clock qualification 
7 .  AEA increased vibration levels qualification 
8 .  AEA modified memory read/write clock qualification 
The multiple qualification tests were performed because of design changes as noted. 
Qualification testing was monitored by periodic test reviews a t  the vendor facility during 
the testing. 
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Spacecraft testing. - The subsystem checkout at the prime contractor and at the 
NASA John F. Kennedy Space Center (KSC) was controlled through a test and checkout 
requirements document for  each spacecraft. The test criteria for  each vehicle were 
supplied to KSC by means of a test and checkout specification and cr i te r ia  document. 
The KSC response to the MSC test requirements document, outlining the details  of the 
t e s t s  to  be performed, was stated in the tes t  and checkout plan. Operational checkout 
procedures controlled the detailed procedures for each test. 
Full mission engineering simulation. - The pr ime contractor 's  FMES was  used to 
integrate AGS hardware and software into a closed-loop, six-degree-of -freedom 
simulation with other flight control hardware and software. The ASA was mounted on 
a flight-attitude table, and all hardware functions were used except the accelerometer 
outputs, which were necessarily simulated for  input to the AEA. An extensive test 
program was performed on the AGS software baseline, the design mission computer 
program (DMCP), followed by tests of each flight program with hardware. Gyro m a s s  
unbalance proved to  be a significant e r r o r  source that could not be eliminated in the 
dynamic tests without complex compensations that were not readily available. 
activation of the FMES facility, a three-degree-of-freedom test was performed on a 
preproduction unit to verify the stability of the attitude-control loop. 
Before 
Certification test requirements. - A ser ies  of performance demonstrations was 
set up in the program as constraints on flight. These tests required formal approval 
of the tes t  plans, o r  certification test requirements, and formal  approval of the docu- 
mented tes t  results,  o r  certification test endorsements. The AGS certification 
requirements included qualification testing of the ASA, the AEA, and the DEDA, and 
demonstration of the AGS EPC, in-flight gyro calibration, mission performance fo r  
the LM-3 Earth-orbit mission, mission performance for  the DMCP software program, 
lunar mission performance, and in-flight accelerometer calibration. To avoid redun- 
dant testing, functions normally evaluated as part of vehicle checkout were not 
performed as certification test requirements. 
Acceptance tests. - One major change in acceptance testing was made when the 
vibration levels f o r  each operating assembly were changed from 3g root-mean-square 
random vibration to 6.6g root mean square. The change was made to ensure adequate 
workmanship rather  than to  reflect  the worst  mission environment (approximately 3g 
root mean square).  The acceptance tests performed on the assemblies are given in 
table VI. Additionally, as a par t  of acceptance for  initial deliveries that were accepted 
as a system, a compatibility test was performed using the three assemblies  that com- 
pr ise  the AGS. The tests performed on the AGS consisted of three sets of calibra- 
tions: a lunar aline, an attitude reference exercise, and a connector waveform test. 
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TABLE VI. - ACCEPTANCE TESTS PERFORMED ON THE AGS 
Tes t  
Vibration I 
Thermal vacuum 
Detailed operational 
Hardwired memory  
Waveform and power supply regulation 
Operational 
Six-position pushbutton activation 
Low-level vibration and pushbutton 
activation 
Temperature 
Leaka 
Luminescence and pushbutton fo rce  
Warmup 
Tes t  connector on/off and calibration 
Gyro scale-factor l inearity and 
asymmetry 
Vibration (launch and boost) and 
calibration 
Servomotor frequency response  
Gyro runup and calibration 
Vibration (ascent/desc ent) and 
calibration 
Pulse moding 
Gyro and acce lerometer  sca le - fac tor  
linearity and asymmetry  and calibratio 
Angular vibration 
Accelerometer pendulum stat ic  friction 
test and calibration 
Gyro scale-factor l inearity and 
asymmetry 
Calibration 
Lbo r t  e lectronics  
assembly  
Data entry and 
isplay assembly  
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
4bo r t  s en  so r 
assembly  
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
a 
1 to 5 hours. 
To detect leaking pushbuttons, this t e s t  was performed in a vacuum and expanded f r o m  
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S of W.a re D eve Io p m e n t 
Software development included the formulation of basic requirements and devel- 
opment procedures, verification methods, and use of the software. 
Software functional description. - The following basic mission requirements 
governed software development. 
1. Orbital insertion shall be achieved within a pericynthion grea te r  than 
9144 meters  (30 000 feet). 
2. Abort to rendezvous from any point in the LM mission shall be accomplished 
within the LM fuel budget. The total ascent differential velocity (delta-V) is 
1946 m/sec (6386 ft/sec), subtracting 7.6 m/sec (25 ft/sec) for  docking. 
3. The maximum navigation e r r o r  incurred during powered descent, hover, and 
powered ascent shall not exceed 762 meters  (2500 feet) and 1.2 m/sec (4 ft/sec). 
4. The AGS must bring the LM within a 9.3-kilometer (5 nautical mile) sphere 
of the CSM with a navigation velocity e r r o r  of less  than 9 m/sec (30 ft/sec). 
The fuel constraint proved to be variable because as vehicle weight increased in 
the course of the program, the available delta-V decreased. The delta-V available for  
rendezvous after insertion, the prime consideration, decreased from 155 m/sec 
(509 ft/sec) to  106 m/sec (349 ft/sec) during the program. To satisfy the software 
requirements, the following capabilities were necessary. 
1. Navigation of the LM and CSM vehicles 
2. Initialization of the LM and CSM state vectors 
3. Alinement of the inertial  reference to a selected coordinate system 
4. Maintenance of vehicle attitude information with respect to inertial  space 
5. Steering of the vehicle 
6. Calibration and compensation of gyro and accelerometer parameters  
7. Solution of the guidance equation 
8. Generation of monitoring data for  displays and telemetry 
9. Automatic in-flight check of computer memory and logic 
To satisfy these requirements, the functions of navigation, alinement, calibration, 
r ada r  data processing, guidance routines, and attitude and engine control were 
implemented. 
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Navigation is performed in the AGS inertial  reference f rame with the origin at 
the center of the attracting body. Sensed velocity increments from the ASA are t rans-  
formed from body to inertial  coordinates and used in the navigation computations when 
a threshold is exceeded. The threshold prevents the integration of accelerometer bias 
during coasting flight. The velocity changes caused by gravity are computed, assuming 
a spherical gravity model for  the attracting body. State vector initialization information 
on the LM and the CSM is obtained from a hardwire interface with the PGS telemetry 
downlink. If the PGNCS is not operational, the data a r e  inputted through the DEDA. 
The absolute time of the AGS is initialized through the DEDA. A time bias exis ts  
between the AGS and the mission t ime because of AGS time-register limitations. Ini- 
tially, LM time was to be based on manning in lunar orbit; a change to mission t ime 
initialized at Earth lift-off required a fixed AGS time bias. The t ime bias is kept in 
the PGS, and epoch time for  AGS initialization has  this  bias subtracted before being 
placed on the primary guidance downlink. 
Alinement consists of updating the AEA direction cosine matrix by one of three 
methods provided. The normal alinement f rame is the landing site local vertical. The 
X-axis passes through the landing site to the center of the Moon, the Z-axis is defined 
by the vector product of the X-axis and the CSM angular momentum vector, and the 
Y-axis completes the orthogonal tr iad.  The PGNCS provides continuous attitude infor- 
mation to integrator reg is te rs  in the AEA by means of hardwired connections from 
coupling data units for  the three pr imary system gimbal angles. Although the AGS 
maintains continuous kno&ledge of the pr imary guidance alinement, the AEA direction 
cosine matrix is updated with the information only on DEDA command. A second 
alinement capability is that of lunar aline, in which ASA accelerometers  are used to 
determine local vertical  with respect to  vehicle coordinates on the lunar surface.  
Azimuth information is supplied from a quantity stored at touchdown or  f rom a DEDA 
input. An azimuth correction factor can be inputted to correct  for  lunar rotation during 
the stay time o r  to correct  for  a CSM plane change. The third alinement mode is body- 
axis aline in which the direction cosine matrix is set to  the body reference frame. 
Three calibration options a r e  available in the AGS software. The gyro and 
accelerometer calibration option is designed for  orbital  operations. The gyros are 
calibrated to  the PGS over a 5-minute period, and the accelerometer readings in free 
fall are compensated during a 30-second period. During in-flight calibration, jet 
fir ings a re  inhibited for accelerometer calibration, and vehicle rates are held below 
0.075 deg/sec for  gyro calibration. The second calibration option is lunar surface 
gyro calibration, which requires  5 minutes. The program initially s tores  the existing 
direction cosine matrix as a reference for  computing drift  compensation. The input 
angular increment is corrected fo r  lunar rotation rate. In the third option, the accel- 
e rometers  a r e  calibrated only in free fall during a 30-second period. 
Radar data are inputted through the DEDA to reduce the e r r o r  in the LM state 
with respect to the CSM. The radar  data inputted through the DEDA are range and 
range rate after nulling the radar  pointing e r r o r  with respect to the Z-ax i s  and storing 
the direction cosine. A minimum of six range/range-rate updates at intervals of 
4 minutes is required f o r  an accurate update. 
(400 nautical miles), nine updates are required. 
For  ranges as long as 741 kilometers 
20 
The five guidance options available are as follows. 
1. The orbital insertion option provides steering and engine cutoff fo r  inserting 
the LM into a desired lunar orbit. 
2. The concentric sequence initiate option computes the horizontal burn required 
to  satisfy targeting conditions, the desired terminal phase initiate (TPI) t ime, and the 
TPI line of sight to the CSM for  a final orbit transfer to the CSM. 
3.  The constant differential height (CDH) routine computes the burn direction and 
magnitude required to  make the LM and CSM orbits coelliptical a t  a predicted CDH 
time. 
4. The TPI  routine calculates the transfer burn for  placing the LM on a direct  
intercept trajectory with the CSM based on a fixed t ransfer  time. 
5. The external delta-V routine accepts components of a velocity-to-be-gained 
V 
tained in a local-horizontal system in real time. 
vector input through the DEDA. The vehicle is pointed along the vector and main- G 
Attitude e r r o r s  are generated by the AEA in accordance with selected control 
modes. During attitude reference alinement and calibration, the e r r o r s  are set to 
zero.  In the attitude-hold mode, the attitude e r r o r s  cause the vehicle to remain at the 
attitude existing when the mode was entered. In the guidance mode, the attitude e r r o r s  
cause the vehicle to s t ee r  in accordance with the guidance equations. In the acquisi- 
tion mode, the attitude e r r o r s  cause the vehicle Z-axis to  point toward the CSM to 
facilitate radar acquisition. 
An engine-on command f rom the AGS is issued only after a set of constraints has  
been satisfied; abort  o r  abort  stage is commanded, a prese t  duration of ullage is 
sensed, the automatic discrete  is present, guidance control is set to AGS, and guidance 
steering is selected through the DEDA. During powered descent, the ullage constraint 
is removed by DEDA command so that, near  the lunar surface, ignition of an engine 
may be instantaneous in the event of a flameout. 
Displays of total attitude, attitude e r ro r s ,  altitude, altitude rate ,  and lateral 
velocity are computed and outputted from the AEA fo r  crew monitoring. The AGS 
outputs a digital telemetry list of 50 words each second for  the monitoring of AGS 
status and performance. 
A ground-support-equipment (GSE) service routine for  loading the AEA memory, 
a DEDA processing routine fo r  AEA/DEDA communications, and an in-flight self-test 
routine for  checking the AEA memory and logic comprise the major software functions. I 
Software development, verification, and use. - The software developed for  the 
AGS was obtained by MSC through a direct  contract with the subcontractor. Integration 
with the hardware program was obtained by using an AGS performance and interface 
specification fo r  software development maintained by the prime contractor and by 
manager for  AGS software development. 
---.---+:-- +I.-+ +I.- -..hnn-+--ntnv hnrrhirrJrn n r n w r a m  manager he nppninted task 
A cyucsuiifj c i i a b  u i ~  UUUCIUIILA Q ~ C V I  alccz .. -- =- -=- ---- 
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A deliverable program, including mission constants and ASA hardware compensa- 
tion constants, was established for  each flight for  the softwired 2048 words of the AGS 
memory. The individual flight programs were amended versions of a DMCP delivered 
in March 1967. This program, although nonflight, was used in the contractor 's  six- 
degree-of -freedom simulation facility to verify AGS performance of the reference 
mission and to satisfy the AGS system responsibility of the contractor.  
The planned software development at program initiation was based on a se r i e s  of 
five design reports  spaced over 11 months from the software vendor in response to and 
interleaved with three data packages from MSC to the vendor. The five design reports  
consisted of the following documents: Design Report (DR) 1 - Preliminary Analysis 
Report; DR 2 - Program Specification and Equation Test  Plan; DR 3 - Equation Simu- 
lation Results Summary, Equations Document, Operating Procedures,  Program 
Checkout Plan, and Performance Analysis Report; DR 4 - Program Checkout Results 
Summary and Program Verification Test Plan; and DR 5 - Program Verification Test 
Re sult s Summary, Programed E quat ions Document, Perf o r  mance Analysis Review 
Report, Program Listing, Binary and Symbolic Card Decks, and Program Tape. 
The three MSC data packages contained special mission requirements and the 
refined mission trajectory consisting of the mission preliminary reference trajectory,  
the reference trajectory,  and the operational trajectory. The AGS software perform- 
ance and interface specification contained all other information required for  software 
development. 
Because the number of design repor t s  proved unwieldy and excessively time 
consuming, five reports  were combined into three.  The development schedule was then 
revised, as follows, in t e rms  of t ime before launch. 
1, At  12.5 months before launch, MSC data package 1, containing the preliminary 
reference trajectory and the mission requirements,  is delivered to the subcontractor. 
2. At  11 months before launch, subcontractor DR 1, containing the program 
specification and the preliminary AGS mission performance analysis, is delivered to 
MSC . 
3. At 10.5 months before launch, MSC performs a cr i t ical  design review of 
DR 1. 
4. A t  8 months before launch, MSC data package 3,  containing the mission 
reference trajectory, is delivered to the subcontractor. 
5. A t  7 months before launch, subcontractor DR 2, including the equation tes t  
resul ts ,  a verification tes t  plan, and a preliminary program, is delivered to MSC. 
6. A t  6.5 months before launch, MSC performs the first ar t ic le  configuration 
inspection (FACI) of DR 2. 
7. At  5 months before launch, subcontractor DR 3,  consisting of a verified 
flight program and related documentation, is delivered to MSC. 
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8. At 4.5 months before launch, MSC performs a customer acceptance readi- 
ness  review (CARR) of DR 3. 
9. At  3 months before launch, MSC data package 3, containing the operational 
flight trajectory,  is delivered to the subcontractor. 
10. At 2 months before launch, the subcontractor performs the final performance 
analysis based on data package 3,  and MSC performs the flight readiness review (FRR). 
11. At 1 .5  months before launch, the subcontractor delivers the final program 
constants tape for  computer loading. 
Af te r  delivery of the baseline program, the development procedure for  the 
balance of the flight programs was shortened to begin at 9 months before launch and 
simplified as follows. 
1. At 9 months before launch, the MSC data package, containing mission 
requirements and the reference trajectory, is delivered to  the subcontractor. 
2. At 8 months before launch, the subcontractor interim design report ,  con- 
taining the program status, the verification test plan, and the performance analysis test 
plan, is delivered to MSC. 
3. At 7 .5  months before launch, MSC performs the FACI review of the interim 
de sign report .  
4. At 6 months before launch, the subcontractor delivers preliminary flow- 
chart  changes, operating procedures changes, and a final computer program specifica- 
tion. The unverified program is deliverable at this t ime for  incorporation in the prime 
contractor FMES and the MSC hybrid simulation. 
5. A t  5 months before launch, the subcontractor delivers the program, including 
verification test resul ts ,  performance analysis resul ts ,  the programed equations docu- 
ment, the operating manual, and a design report. The program is delivered in the 
form of a binary deck and listing, a bench-test equipment loading tape, and an accept- 
ance checkout equipment (ACE) tape for  vehicle use. 
6. A t  4 .5  months before launch, MSC performs a CARR of the program delivery 
package. 
7.  At 8 weeks before launch, the MSC operational trajectory,  mission data, 
and constants a r e  supplied to the subcontractor. 
8. At  5 weeks before launch, the subcontractor delivers the final flight program 
with updated constants in ACE format and the final performance analysis. An FRR is 
performed at MSC. 
subcontractor software review board approves the release.  
Before subcontractor submittal of documentation, an internal 
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The performance analysis performed fo r  program delivery 5 months before 
launch consisted of Monte Carlo runs using the ASA specification e r r o r  model and the 
ASA capability estimate e r r o r  model in mission simulations. The mission simulation 
cases  selected were the most stringent and always included abort f rom hover. The 
performance analysis performed 5 weeks before launch used an e r r o r  model generated 
f rom data taken on the flight model ASA. 
Verification of proper computer loading was accomplished in the following 
manner. The flight program card deck delivered at the CARR was transposed by the 
prime contractor to an ACE tape o r  the format used to load the AEA by the ACE com- 
puter at KSC. The prime contractor ACE tape was transmitted to the subcontractor for  
independent verification and then sent to  KSC. The final AEA dump, after loading with 
the constants-updated program in ACE format (supplied by the subcontractor 5 weeks 
before launch), was compared with the prime -contractor-generated ACE tape, and the 
noncomparing memory locations (noncompares) were printed out. The noncompares, 
which represent the updated mission constants, were compared with a list of expected 
noncomparing locations supplied by the subcontractor at the time of the FRR. An 
additional verification procedure for comparing the original subcontractor binary card 
deck with the final memory dump was also followed for  the first flight but was discarded 
for  later flights because of redundancy. 
The verification procedures used in the course of program development by the 
subcontractor consisted of equation testing, program checkout, verification testing, 
and performance analysis. Scientific o r  engineering simulations of the equations in a 
closed-loop configuration were designed to demonstrate equation performance under 
both nominal conditions and vehicle, sensor,  or  trajectory dispersions of 3 standard 
deviations (3a). Testing of the coded program was performed by using a bit-by-bit 
interpretive computer simulation (ICs). This  check verified that the program was  
implemented in accordance with the equations. 
A closed-loop interpretive simulation of the AEA program and the vehicle flight 
characterist ics (ICs flight simulator (FS)) was used in verification testing. Verification 
that the program w a s  capable of guiding and controlling the vehicle in all operating 
modes was accomplished. Special ICs dr iver  routines a lso were formulated to augment 
this  test. A Monte Carlo analysis program using 600 cycles was performed to deter-  
mine detailed AGS performance compared to mission requirements. 
Verification also was performed at  MSC by using a hybrid computer facility with 
actual ASA and DEDA hardware for  independent tes t  c a s e s  and by using special test 
cases in the subcontractor ICS/FS program. Additional testing for  each mission was 
performed by the prime contractor with a six-degree-of -freedom computer simulation 
incorporating the AGS as well as other hardware components in the LM flight control 
system. 
The selection of hardware compensation constants for  the final program tape was 
made after examination of the data history of the actual flight ASA. In all cases ,  the 
examination resulted in the selection of the final bench calibration values with the 
exception of the accelerometer scale factor,  which was extrapolated to the time of the 
mission. The predictable effects of magnet aging on the accelerometer scale factor 
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enabled this  extrapolation. The gyro values were checked by Earth prelaunch calibra- 
tions performed after final ASA installation in the vehicle. The EPC uncertainty of 
0.37 deg/hr and the stability exhibited by the ASA'led to maintaining the compensation 
values at those obtained by the more accurate bench calibration. In-flight calibration 
of gyro and accelerometer biases before undocking in lunar orbit allowed final compen- 
sations fo r  the mission. 
Other software deliverables supplied t o  MSC were EPC tapes and simulated flight 
procedures. Earth prelaunch calibration w a s  a 20-minute special program for  deter-  
mination of gyro drift  in the vehicle sway environment. The other ASA parameters  
used in the EPC tape for  compensation were derived from data taken during the first 
ASA bench calibration at KSC. 
The simulated flight program consisted of a set of procedures used with a speci- 
fied flight program to simulate various mission phases. The purpose of the simulated 
flight was to  gain confidence in AGS operation with interfacing LM subsystems. Simu- 
lated flight procedures of the AGS were designed to test AGS simulated flight initializa- 
tion; CSM acquisition; radar  filter; abort from powered descent; abort  f rom the lunar 
surface; and coelliptic sequence initiate (CSI), CDH, TPI, and external delta-V guidance 
solutions. The criteria for  the t e s t s  were obtained from interpretive computer simula- 
tions and resulted in value bounds o r  bounded curves for various AEA and display 
parameters .  Simulated flights were performed throughout AGS testing as an integral  
part  of operational checkout. 
Software changes were accomplished through the submittal of software change 
proposals generated independently o r  on request by the software vendor. A formal  
MSC board, controlling both AGS and PGNCS software, reviewed the software change 
proposals . 
Abort Guidance System Mission Revisions 
Revisions to  the AGS mission are discussed in the following paragraphs. The 
major change consisted of replacement of the direct-ascent trajectory for  rendezvous 
with the coelliptic flight plan. 
Direct ascent. - The first AGS rendezvous concept was a minimum-time, direct-  
ascent trajectory to  the CSM following abort. The CSM orbital altitude for  th i s  mission 
was  148 kilometers (80 nautical miles). F o r  CSM phase angles that precluded direct  
ascent, the AGS was placed in a parking orbit at the insertion altitude and then at 
15 240 me te r s  (50 000 feet) to obtain the maximum catchup rate to  the CSM. Data for  
orbital t ransfer  to  the CSM were obtained from external sources. 
Coelliptic flight plan. - In January 1966, the direct-ascent concept was  discarded 
and replaced by the coelliptic flight plan, which essentially provided fo r  an  LM parking 
orbit  fo r  all ascent cases.  The CSM orbital  altitude was changed to  111 kilometers 
(60 nautical miles) for  this  procedure. A diagram of the coelliptic sequence is given 
in figure 3. 
25 
= LM orbit 
-CSM orbit 
=t ime of ignit ion of 
- line-of-sight angle second bu rn  
Figure 3. - Coelliptic rendezvous flight 
profile . 
The AGS, following abort o r  ascent 
f rom the lunar surface, inser t s  the LM into 
a lunar orbit based on insertion altitude, 
insertion altitude rate ,  and desired lunar 
orbit, usually 17 by 56 kilometers (9 by 
30 nautical miles), under automatic control. 
The LM coasts  until the time of ignition of 
the first burn tigA, which places the LM 
approximately 90" from the insertion point. 
At that time, the rendezvous profile is ini- 
tiated with the CSI maneuver. The burn is 
normally done in the external delta-V mode 
using the reaction control system (RCS), as 
are all burns of the rendezvous sequence. 
The CSI burn magnitude is determined by an 
iterative technique such that a desired rela- 
tionship between the CSM and the LM exis ts  at a specified t ime (time of ignition of the 
third burn tigc) following a maneuver to produce a CDH between the CSM and the LM. 
The CDH burn following CSI is performed at the predicted time of LM orbit apofocus 
(or perifocus). Because of this  burn, the LM orbit becomes coelliptic with that of the 
CSM, the line of apsides of the two orbits is alined, and a constant differential altitude 
between the two vehicles exists. The final planned burn of the sequence, TPI, is per-  
formed at the point at which a desired line-of-sight angle (usually 26.6") between the 
LM and the CSM is reached. The magnitude is based on a fixed t ransfer  t ime to ren- 
dezvous, usually equivalent to a 130" central  angle transfer.  The parameters  of the 
t ransfer  trajectory are determined by iteration to  bring the LM to  the predicted position 
of the CSM at the specified time. Two midcourse maneuvers are performed, as 
required, after TPI, and the burns are computed by the same technique used for  the 
TPI maneuver. The braking maneuver for  docking is originated at a range of 9.3 kilo- 
meters  (5 nautical miles). A range and range-rate chart  profile is followed, inter-  
leaved with nulling of the line-of-sight rate. 
The sequence of events following an abort  depends extensively on the t ime of 
abort. The nominal sequence outlined is used for aborts near the lunar surface. For  
aborts  before powered descent, the TPI  maneuver may be performed initially. The 
nominal sequence is also subject to extensive changes in the course of mission planning. 
A fixed o r  canned external delta-V maneuver can be performed before CSI; a dual CSI 
burn may be performed before CDH; and phasing maneuvers may be incorporated as 
requirements for  landing site selection, rendezvous lighting, and rendezvous location 
dictate. 
Mission Operation 
The AGS is maintained operational in a ready state throughout the lunar mission 
as a backup to  the PGS. A nominal operational profile is described in this  section. 
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Lunar orbit. - The AGS is inoperative during the translunar-coast phase, and the 
ASA heaters  maintain the ASA at a temperature of 322 K (120" F). Coolant is not sup- 
plied to the ASA coldplate. After the crewmen enter the LM in lunar orbit, the system 
is activated and the gyros are tested for  a minimum of 25 minutes. An AEA self-test 
consisting of an AEA memory sum check and logic test is performed by DEDA com- 
mand. The DEDA operation and the E L  segment operation a r e  verified. The AEA 
time is initialized by a DEDA entry, and an  LM and CSM state vector initialization 
from the PGS downlink is performed. The AGS is then alined to the PGS, and the 
resul ts  are checked by monitoring the total-attitude indicators and the system digital 
downlink. The initialization of the AGS is checked by calling up the range and the 
range ra te  to the CSM and the in-plane angle between the Z-body axis and the local 
horizontal on the DEDA and by comparing the PGS readings. In-flight calibration of 
the AGS gyros and accelerometers is then performed. 
Powered descent. - The gyro drift and navigation e r r o r s  of the AGS are mitigated 
for  the descent phase by a state vector initialization from the primary system 10 min- 
utes before powered descent and by analinement to the pr imary system 5 minutes 
before powered descent. During powered descent, the AGS is in the followup attitude 
reference mode because the primary system is in the vehicle-control mode. The AGS 
independently maintains an attitude reference,  navigates, and solves the abort  problem. 
The attitude, altitude, and altitude r a t e s  of the AGS are compared with those of the 
pr imary system during descent. The LM inertial velocity is displayed on the DEDA. 
At an altitude of 1829 meters  (6000 feet), the AGS navigation e r r o r s  are further 
reduced by a DEDA altitude update. An AGS abort may be accomplished at any t ime by 
switching guidance control to AGS and pressing the abort button. 
Lunar surface. - After touchdown, the AGS lunar surface azimuth is stored. Fol- 
lowing a decision to stay, the LM state vector is initialized using information stored in 
the AEA before descent that reflects the lunar surface state, and the AGS is placed in 
lunar aline. When all systems are verified as operational, the AGS is initialized and 
alined to the pr imary system, the lunar azimuth is again stored, and an AGS lunar 
surface gyro calibration is performed. The AGS is then placed in standby with only 
the ASA operational fo r  the duration of the stay on the lunar surface. 
Before ascent, AGS time, state vectors,  and alinement are again initialized, and 
a lunar surface gyro calibration is performed. The AGS is placed in lunar aline 
approximately 30 minutes before lift-off and is changed to guidance steering 2 minutes 
before lift-off to  reduce gyro drift effects on the attitude reference. 
Powered ascent. - During ascent, the AGS is in followup and is independently 
navigating and solving the insertion problem. The thrust  axis  VG is monitored on the 
DEDA during the latter half of ascent. Initially, AGS total velocity is monitored. 
After insertion cutoff, the AGS velocity residuals in each axis a r e  compared with the 
PGS and t r immed.  
Rendezvous sequence. - After insertion, the AGS is updated in relation to the CSM 
by the insertion of radar  range and range-rate information through the DEDA. The 
P S S  facilitates rendezvous radar  acquisition of the CSM by a mode that points the 
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vehicle Z - a x i s  at the CSM. Nine range and range-rate points are required before the 
first coelliptic sequence maneuver, CSI; six points a r e  required before each subsequent 
powered maneuver. The AGS independently solves for  each powered maneuver and 
operates without dependence on the PGS after insertion for  rendezvous. 
Abort Sensor Assembly Development Problems 
The following significant problems were encountered during the development of 
the ASA. 
Initial accelerometer selection. - The Bell IIIB accelerometer was originally 
proposed f o r  the AGS and approved. At the t ime of program initiation, however, strong 
arguments were advanced by the contractor for  switching to the Bell VII, a new, 
scaled-down version of the Bell IIIB. Although the Bell IIIB operational and test experi- 
ence was extensive during the Ranger Program and at the NASA Jet  Propulsion Labora- 
tory, the arguments for  savings of 1 . 1  kilograms (2.5 pounds) in weight, 0.0005 cubic 
meter  (29 cubic inches) in volume, and 4 watts of steady-state power were attractive. 
The deciding argument, however, was that hermetic sealing of the Bell IIIB would be 
expensive in t e r m s  of scheduling, requiring 16 weeks for delivery of an unsealed unit 
and 8 months fo r  delivery of a sealed unit compared to 4 weeks for  initial sealed 
Bell VI1 delivery. A change w a s  made to the Bell VI1 unit. Subsequent events, how- 
ever ,  revealed that the hermetic sealing of the Bell VI1 had not been adequately proved, 
and a redesign of the case was required to prevent "oil canning. " Subsequent bias 
stability and contamination problems with the Bell VII have indicated that the original 
selection of the Bell IIIB accelerometer was correct .  
Spin motion rotation detectors. - The necessity for monitoring gyro wheelspeed 
became apparent in the early stages of the program. Platinum cobalt slugs were added 
to the gyro wheels with a pickoff c o i l  to  generate a pulse for  each wheel revolution. 
The spin motion rotation detectors a lso served to check wheel runup and rundown t imes  
and, therefore, bearing integrity. 
Noise. - A general electronic noise problem within the ASA became apparent with 
the integration of the first ASA. Inertial performance changed when the test-connector 
outputs were capped instead of being connected to the tes t  set .  No single design 
change eliminated noise problems. Corrective actions taken included eliminating 
ground loops with the tes t  se t  connected, rerouting sensitive internal leads, twist- 
ing instrument torquer leads instead of using shielded cable, using shields between 
the pulse torque servoamplifiers and the power supply, and connecting secondary power 
ground internally to chassis  ground. 
Temperature maintenance. - The ASA instruments were heated through a beryl- 
lium block rather  than through individual sensor  heaters.  The beryllium block repre-  
sented an extensive design task, requiring complex shaping and drilling to achieve 
proper heat t ransfer  and thermal gradients. Nine designs for  the beryllium block were 
required to achieve the final design. 
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Internal cabling. - Flexible, multilayer printed circuit  cable was  used in the 
interconnecting internal harnessing of the first preproduction ASA primarily because 
of the weight and volume limitations of conventional wiring. This  method required more 
volume than anticipated, had an unsatisfactory appearance because the cable would not 
stay molded around corners ,  and was impractical from the standpoint of accommodating 
design changes. Conventional point-to-point stranded wiring in bundles was used in the 
second preproduction ASA . 
Thermal  design. - The ASA power supply was located between the main housing 
and the heat sink. The preproduction power supply was  potted in a thermal  conducting 
compound that allowed heat to permeate through the compound from the main housing 
and the power supply to the heat sink surface. The thermal  conductivity of the potting 
compound, however, was not as high as anticipated (0.5 W/m-K (0.3 Btu/hr/ft-OF) 
compared to 36.5 W/m-K (21 Btu/hr/ft-OF)), and a weight penalty was incurred because 
of the dense potting compound. The production power supply was designed such that all 
significant heat-producing components and modules were heat sunk directly to the cold- 
plate side of the power supply housing. A less dense potting compound could then be 
used with considerable weight reduction. Heat from the main housing was routed by 
two studs through the power supply to  the coldplate surface. These studs incorporated 
adjustable slugs by which the thermal  path between the main housing and coldplate could 
be varied. The capability of tr imming total power consumption after ASA assembly 
was gained. 
Mounting feet. - Each pair of preproduction ASA mounting feet was an integral 
unit at each end of the housing. Each foot contained a Mycalex ring that served as a 
thermal  barrier, but machining the Mycalex was difficult. Because of continued 
exposure to the specified vibration environment, fatigue failures occurred. An individ- 
ual suspension system was incorporated for  the production design. Each foot was 
attached to the block with a thermal path small  enough to eliminate the need for  
Mycalex. The body of each titanium foot w a s  hollowed, and an aluminum slug covered 
with an elastomer was inserted to  provide damping and to prevent exceeding the speci- 
fication resonance requirements. 
A second change was necessary when high resonances occurred as a result  of 
e las tomer deterioration caused by extended periods of vibration. Several other materi-  
als were tested fo r  damping efficiency when inserted in the foot in place of the aluminum 
slug and the elastomer.  Although analysis indicated otherwise, a solid titanium foot 
did provide adequate damping and was  less difficult to manufacture. Solid titanium was 
incorporated into the foot design. 
Cover support. - The preproduction ASA cover that served as the support member 
for  the three  connectors was undesirable structurally and t ime consuming to remove. 
A separate s t ructural  member was  designed to support the connectors, and the cover 
was  redesigned. 
I 
Accelerometer scale-factor temperature sensitivity. - The Bell VII accelerometer 
scale-factor temperature sensitivity was  higher than tolerable. Temperature compen- 
sation was incorporated into the accelerometer design, but the accelerometer was later 
I discarded because of contamination problems. 
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Thermal runaway. - A potential thermal  runaway existed in the ASA design if the 
sensing thermistor controlling the fast warmup opened or  if the t r im res i s tor  short  
circuited. This condition could endanger other equipment on the LM adjacent to the 
ASA. A normally closed thermostat set  t o  open at a temperature of 339 K (150" F) 
(322 K (120" F) normal operation) and set  to close at 328 K (130" F) was  incorporated 
in ser ies  with the +12-volt ASA power supply caution-and-warning (C&W) signal. The 
ASA is turned off manually if the display indicates a malfunction on this  line. 
Accelerometer warmup. - The Bell VII accelerometer bias had an excessively 
long warmup time. The requirement for  *30pg of steady state in 25 minutes was 
violated by several  hundred milligals (pg's) for several  hours. The long warmup was 
caused by an electrostatic charge buildup between the capacitor plates and the torquer 
coil on the pendulum when the torquer coil potential was 16 volts above ground and by 
a change in the resulting electrostatic forces  on the pendulum as the charge leaked off 
gradually. 
The accelerometer torquer is operated at  a 16-volt, direct-current potential 
relative to ground because of the PTSA design. This  potential causes  buildup of an 
electrostatic charge between the pendulum and the capacitor plates that is inversely 
proportional to the relative distance between them. When the pendulum is not physi- 
cally centered, one plate exer t s  a greater  force on the pendulum than the other. 
Because of low leakage rates of the bridge circuit  capacitors, much t ime is required 
to  null the electrostatic forces.  The long t ime constant causes  the effective bias to 
change proportionately. 
Initially, a capacitor adjustment was made to bring the electrical  null around 
which the accelerometer operates into coincidence with the electrostatic null. Bleed 
res i s tors  were later added to drain the electrostatic charge. 
Cover design. - Problems developed in building the single-piece ASA cover. The 
initial procedure w a s  to build the inner skin first, bond honeycomb core mater ia l  to it, 
and then bond the outer skin to the honeycomb. To facilitate manufacturing, the honey- 
comb core mater ia l  was changed to polyurethane foam. The foam, however, separated 
at the bond line during extended vibration, and the core material  was changed back to  
honeycomb. 
Additionally, during environmental testing, pins from the electronic subassem- 
blies shorted, through tolerance buildup, to the inner aluminum skin of the cover 
through an insulating fiberglass board. The inner aluminum skin of the cover was 
replaced with fiberglass. The thermal  and EM1 effects of the change were acceptable. 
Thermal-vacuum effects. - Because of thermal-vacuum exposure as high as 
0.7 deg/hr, gyro bias shifts occurred during initial ASA testing. 
first thought to be thermal because the temperature difference between the gyros and 
the mounting block increased as much as 1.1 K (2" F) under vacuum conditions. The 
gyro mounting holes were enlarged to  minimize changes in heat flow ac ross  the airgap 
from the gyro case to the mounting block between ambient and vacuum conditions. This  
action did not correct  the problem. A thermally conductive compound was then applied 
to the gyro sea ts  to prevent the thermal res is tance ac ross  the interface from being 
affected by pressure variations. This addition reduced the thermal-vacuum shifts 
below the 0.3-deg/hr specification. 
The problem was 
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Gyro m a s s  unbalance instability. - Both long- and short-term m a s s  unbalance 
instabilities became evident in the RI-1139B gyro. The long-term shifts violated the 
initial specification requirement of 2 deg/hr/g; thus, the use of m a s s  unbalance became 
an uncertain indicator of bearing wear. The sh i f t s  were orientation dependent and pre-  
dictable with orientation change. The cause of the shifts was presumed to be settling of 
the two-cut gyro flotation fluid under gravity conditions. Gyro circle tests were insti- 
tuted during acceptance to determine that the shift magnitude was bounded, and the 
specification was relaxed to a value of 4 deg/hr/g. Because of the fixed sensors ,  the 
ASA has  the advantage that only X-gyro-spin-axis m a s s  unbalance (due to  thrusting) is 
a significant e r r o r  source in the mission. Corrective action was taken to s tore  both 
the ASA units and the gyros before installation in a fixed orientation to  eliminate the 
m a s s  unbalance shifts. The ASA shipping container w a s  modified to mount the ASA 
X-axis vertical, as it is mounted in the vehicle, ra ther  than the previous Z-axis verti-  
cal. The gyros were preassigned a specific ASA axis and stored in the position before 
m a s s  unbalance t r im.  After acceptance, they were maintained in the chosen position 
until ASA installation. 
The short- term instability was observed during processing by the gyro manufac- 
t u re r  and the ASA vendor. Because of the different torquing methods used at the two 
installations, the shift was found. Analog torquing used by the manufacturer dissipated 
0.7 watt. Pulse torquing used by the vendor put 1 .3  watts in the torquer. The manu- 
facturer  corrected this  discrepancy by performing the final mass  unbalance adjustment 
with 1 .3  watts dissipated in the torquer. 
Gyro fluid contamination. - Erra t ic  gyro drift  was  evident in the first units pro- 
duced by the manufacturer. Particle contamination was found in three units. Extensive 
changes were made in quality control procedures, and improvements were made in the 
manufacturer's cleanroom facility. Fluid control was tightened, wax seals were 
eliminated from the fill system, a molecular seine was added, and a back pressure.fi l1 
system was  used. 
Accelerometer bias instability. - Accelerometer bias shifts of several  hundred 
milligals (pg's) were observed at the inception of the Bell VI1 program. Investigation 
of these shifts  revealed that they were asymptotic and storage and temperature depend- 
ent and that a maximum shift of 9OOpg w a s  possible over a 5-day period when stored 
with the input-axis up and then down and with the temperature maintained at 339 K 
(150" F). Reducing the storage temperature to 322 K (120" F), the ASA operating 
temperature,  reduced the shift to 300pg peak to peak. The fixed ASA storage, adopted 
because of gyro mass  unbalance shifts, also mitigated the problem. The shift was 
traced to the c reep  rate of the epoxy joint between the aluminum structure and the pen- 
dulum copper beryllium spring. The ASA shipping containers were modified to reduce 
the storage temperature from 339 K (150" F) to 322 K (120" F). The IFC of accelerom- 
eter bias, previously incorporated in the AGS software, contributed to eliminating the 
effects of the instability during the mission. 
Accelerometer contamination. - A significant ASA problem developed because of 
contamination within the Bell VII accelerometer. The failure mode w a s  the adhering 
of the accelerometer pendulum to one of the capacitive pickoff plates while in the off 
mode such that the 3g restoring force of the loop would not f ree  it upon activation. The 
fai lures  occurred on units that had been in L I I ~  LIIZ'LU I U ~  a y p * v L b - a - . - - - - J  "- - r z - ' A  nnnvnvimotolv y e a r -  The 
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pendulums on two field units were definitely captured, and a third exhibited a tendency 
to  stick. During analysis of the contaminant, two pr imary substances were noticed on 
the brass capacitive pickoff plates. One substance was a viscous film composed of 
amines from a catalyst used in curing the encapsulant for a t ransformer within the 
accelerometer. The second w a s  a whitish growth composed principally of zinc chloride. 
Tests indicated that the contaminant could be grown on b r a s s  in the presence of contam- 
inant sources. Dezincification of the b r a s s  would occur in the presence of chlorine and 
moisture. 
A pendulum freedom test, open loop, was performed to screen the accelerometer.  
The test criterion was that the pendulum fall free from a capacitive pickoff plate within 
6"  of vertical. Of the 26 units tested, 15 exhibited a degree of stickiness. An outgas- 
sing procedure was incorporated to eliminate the contaminant. Al l  seven units commit- 
ted exhibited stickiness after a temperature cycle following reassembly. The theory 
was that moisture entered the units because the accelerometers  were not sealed during 
this  cycle. 
To provide a "superclean" accelerometer,  more comprehensive processing 
changes were instituted as follows. 
1. A l l  components were outgassed at l e s s  than 100 micrometers.  
2. Temperature cycling and magnet stabilization were performed in dry 
nitrogen. 
3. Use of chlorothene cleaner was eliminated. 
4. Use  of tapwater (chlorine) was eliminated. 
5.  Silicone grease was eliminated from all vacuum processing. 
6. Flux was eliminated. 
7. The b ras s  capacitor ring surface was cleaned with a glass  brush. 
8. A l l  tape used in final assembly was outgassed o r  eliminated. 
9. Each unit was vacuum outbaked 4 hours before final sea l  and backfill. 
10. Each unit was filled with 75 percent dry helium and 25 percent dry nitrogen 
instead of 25 percent air. 
11 .  A l l  par t s  were stored in dry nitrogen. 
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Recycling the units through the outlined procedure did not remove the contaminant, 
and a pendulum remained stuck on one unit. At this point, the following options were 
considered. 
1. To embed jewels in the capacitive pickoff ring to reduce the area touching the 
pendulum 
2. To recycle the accelerometers through an even more stringent cleaning 
procedure 
3. To  compartmentalize the accelerometers and, thereby, to separate the elec- 
t r ical  components f rom the mechanical par ts  
4. To change the b r a s s  pickoff plates t o  titanium despite the difficulty in machin- 
ing titanium 
5. To change the accelerometer 
Based on favorable resu l t s  of an investigation of the 2401 accelerometer for  ASA usage, 
a decision was made to change accelerometers.  
Gyro scale-factor asymmetry. - An e r r o r  source not initially under specification 
control produced a significant dynamic drift rate in a rotational vibration environment. 
The e r r o r  source was gyro scale-factor asymmetry, the difference in gyro scale-factor 
e r r o r  between a positive and a negative input rate. Although gyro scale-factor non- 
linearity e r r o r  was specified at 180 pulses/min to limit the asymmetry to 360 pulses/ 
min, the drift rate d produced for a fixed, square-wave ra te  of 1 deg/sec is 
d = 360 x 
revealed that, for  all input rates, a value of 200 pulses/min o r  less was required in 
the Y-axis and a value of 360 pulses/min or  less was required in the X-axis and the 
Z-axis. Examination of a wide range of input rates,  in addition to the 3 deg/sec in 
which scale-factor nonlinearity is normally measured, revealed the scale-factor 
asymmetry to be as large as 500 pulses/min. Two ASA units were determined to  be 
unacceptable f o r  flight because of large asymmetry readings. 
x 1 x 0.5 x 3600 = 0.65 deg/hr. Results of mission e r r o r  analysis 
The effect of noise on the current pulse used to torque the gyro caused the asym- 
metry. The noise originated from two sources. Synchronous noise spikes of 8 kilo- 
her tz  riding on the current  pulse affected the area under the current  pulse as it 
shortened and lengthened, and deformation was also found on the trailing edge of the 
64 OOO-pulse/sec output, which determines switching of the gyro torquer current.  In 
the correct ive design changes, the synchronous 8-kilohertz value was  changed to  
asynchronous 8.25 kilohertz to allow the noise effects to be averaged and to derive a 
stable 64 kilohertz separately from the frequency countdown module. A specification 
of 120 pulses/min at all input rates was placed on gyro scale-factor asymmetry; 
however, th i s  requirement was violated a t  low rates after the modifications in several  
cases ,  and a curve defining allowable asymmetry as a function of input ra te  was 
specified. 
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Gyro resonance. - A s  a result  of skewed-axis vibration tes t s  on ASA units in the 
3-hertz range, a determination was made that significant drift  rates could be induced 
fo r  sinusoidal inputs. 
(HVSIR). In an unperturbed condition, the gyro wheel rotates  in synchronism with the 
stator field. If a low frequency sinusoidal angular rate is applied about the spin axis, 
the wheel will remain in synchronism with the stator field. If the sinusoidal rate is 
increased, however, the magnetic effect will not be strong enough to drive the wheel in 
synchronism with the stator field, and the wheel will not follow the sinusoidal stator 
motion. Between synchronism and asynchronism, the wheel is excited at  a resonant 
frequency. Small angular r a t e s  at this  frequency (3  hertz) about the spin axis can cause 
large deviations in instantaneous wheelspeed and result in gyro angular momentum. If 
sinusoidal inputs of the same frequency and phasing are applied simultaneously about 
the input and spin axes, a positive spin-axis rate will cause the angular momentum to 
increase momentarily for  positive rates applied about the input axis and to decrease 
momentarily for  negative rates. Float precession is grea te r  for  positive inputs, and 
a positive drift ra te  results.  
The e r r o r  source was the H-vector spin input rectification 
For the HVSIR e r r o r  to become significant, the frequencies applied to the spin 
and input axes  must be the same, be in phase, and be at the frequency of gyro 
resonance. Analyses and simulations proved that the LM vehicle limit cycling did not 
approach this  condition, and no corrective action was necessary.  
Accelerometer vibration limitations. - The Bell VII accelerometer had restr ic t ive 
vibration limitations because of the physical construction and the low electrical  damping 
of the loop. The accelerometer is filled with a gas;  this  condition provides negligible 
pendulum damping. The accelerometer loop was designed to accommodate accelera-  
tions of 3g for an expected mission thrust  environment of less than one g. 
random vibration ranging from 1. Og to 1.2g root mean square,  derived from the 
LM g /hertz environment with a peak at 60 hertz, caused the pendulum to hit the me- 
chanical stops and resulted in unacceptable loss  of input information. 
Linear 
2 
Extensive vehicle tes t s  using line RCS fir ings determined the vehicle environment 
to be 0.7g root mean square, and the ASA was qualified at 0.9g root mean square, a 
very low level. Rescaling the accelerometer to 15g was studied, but replacement of 
the Bell VII accelerometer with the fluid-damped 2401 accelerometer removed concern 
for  the ASA vibration environment. 
Gyro output-axis rotation effect. - During bench calibration, a large misalinement 
shift, although less than the specification of 130 arc-seconds, was found on several  
units. After-an investigation,- the cause of the apparent misalinement was attributed to 
an instability in the gyro output when rotated about the output axis  (OA). Analysis and 
testing proved that the effect was not significant in mission performance and was not a 
failure precursor. The cause of the phenomenon was postulated as friction between 
the OA pivot and the jewel. When a gyro is rotated about the OA, gyroscopic action 
causes  the float to precess  about the input axis until the OA pivot contacts the jewel. 
When the pivot and the jewel are touching, the resultant friction will cause a torque to 
be exerted on the OA shaft. The torque appears  to be directly proportional to the OA 
rate. Reversal of the OA rotation will move the pivot off the jewel wall and will cause 
contact with the jewel on the other side. The e r r o r  source is rectification of OA angu- 
lar motion through unequal friction effects  on opposite s ides  of the jewel. 
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Fast warmup oscillation. - During vehicle testing at KSC, vehicle a l a rms  were 
triggered when the ASA fast warmup circuitry was in operation. The problem was  due 
to a noise of 13  megahertz that was placed on the vehicle 28-volt line by the ASA. A 
0.1-microfarad capacitor was added to the fast-warmup-unit output to  eliminate the 
oscillations that were traced to the characterist ics of a t ransis tor  in the heater 
circuitry . 
Coldplate connection. - Helacoil inser t s  having a locking feature a r e  used in the 
ASA for  attachment of the coldplate. Repeated mounting and dismounting caused many 
f rac tures  in the inser t  and necessitated replacement. To cor rec t  this  problem, short  
screws that did not engage the locking mechanism were used during vehicle testing. 
Full length screws were used for  the final mounting of the ASA at KSC. 
Gyro flexible lead. - A flexible lead failure on a nonflight gyro was attributed t o  
weakening of the lead due to the formation of silver bromide corrosion on the lead and 
to a nick in the lead caused by faulty workmanship. Test resul ts  revealed that 
bromine from the flotation fluid, polybromotrifluoroethylene, came out of solution t o  
combine with si lver lead only above 393 K (248" F). Because the ASA operates at 
322 K (120" F) and the gyro was maintained in an uncontrolled environment, the failure 
was attributed to poor workmanship and overheating. No evidence of s i lver  bromide 
was found in dismantling other units. 
Abort E I ect ro n i cs As se m b I y D eve I op me n t P rob I em s 
The following significant problems were encountered during the development of 
the AEA. 
Memory cycle time. - A 4-microsecond memory cycle t ime was the design goal 
originally set in the AEA program. This time was changed to 5 microseconds after 
the design was  proved incapable of accommodating the faster cycle time. 
Memory structure.  - A memory failure occurred during qualification testing 
because of drive lines opening in the core  stack. The problem was a s t ructural  failure 
in a hat bracket supporting one of the memory endboards. The bracket was strength- 
ened, and the unit subsequently passed qualification tests. 
Sideplate screws. - Vibration caused loosening of several  screws inside and 
outside the AEA. Manufacturing procedures were changed to torque all sc rews  in a 
specified sequence to a designated level (68 + 5.6 joules (6 + 0.5  inch-pounds)). The 
addition of a sealing compound to the external screwheads was also necessary,  although 
use of the compound was undesirable because of potential contamination. 
Clock. - An external clock was used in the programer concept for  the AGS, and 
th i s  concept w a s  carr ied over to the AEA t o  minimize vehicle EM1 and synchronization 
problems. The AEA used a frequency of 1.024 megahertz f rom the vehicle instrumen- 
tation master  clock. The PGS clock provides a synchronization clock output to the 
instrumentation clock. Results of testing revealed that activation of the pr imary 
system produced initial noise transients through instrumentation that affected the AEA 
mernury. After ei-aluating z i ~ d  re ject ing the possibility of adding a one-shot multivi- 
brator  to the AEA clock input, a free-running (18-pulse/min stability), independent 
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crystal  oscillator was installed in the AEA to cor rec t  the problem. Problems were 
encountered in crystal  procurement in that frequency shifts down to one-third the funda- 
mental frequency of l .  024 megahertz were observed. These shifts were caused by 
lower resistance at some harmonics than at the fundamental frequency. The specifica- 
tion on the crystal  was for  a response (6 decibels down) only in the region within 
25 percent of the fundamental frequency. A tank circuit  was placed after the c rys ta l  to 
attenuate spurious frequencies. 
Cable discoloration. - Several AEA Teflon-coated, shielded cables turned green 
and were replaced. The discoloration started at the connector end and extended up the 
cable. The chemically passive substance was a resin salt from the res in  f l u  used in 
soldering . 
Thermal discoloration. - A classic thermal  discoloration (purple plague) problem 
was encountered in the AEA program on the t rans is tors  having a gold-to-aluminum 
bond. The par t s  were replaced with substitutes having aluminum-to-aluminum internal 
bonds. 
Write pulse undershoot. - A memory loss  problem occurred that was traced to the 
shape of the write pulse in the coincident current  memory. The sharp  fall time of the 
write pulse resulted in an undershoot that added to the inhibit pulse such that the state 
of the core could be changed. The timing circuitry was redesigned to slow the fall of 
the write pulse f rom 40 to 200 nanoseconds (1500-nanosecond pulse) and to eliminate 
the undershoot. 
Ceramic capacitors. - 'Ceramic capacitors had a workmanshipjdesign fault in that 
the nailhead bond that connects the external leads to the ceramic slug did not h%ve 
enough surface a rea  (0.0152 square mill imeters (30 mils))  to  form a good bond, and 
the leads, under stress, broke off at the slug. The problem was compounded by the 
fact  that the capacitor is square;  after soldering to the board, twisting to make the 
capacitor lie flat caused tension on the leads. The ceramic  capacitors were replaced. 
Sense amplifier t ransformers .  - Six failures were encountered with one of the 
t ransformers  because of lack of stress relief between the internal coil and the attaching 
lead. The problem was not discovered during par t  lot qualification testing because no 
stress was put on the lead until AEA installation. These par t s  were replaced. 
Split-pin wire wrapping. - The split-pin w i r e  wrapping technique used to  connect 
the terminals from the multilayer boards to the matrix board had an inherent flaw. 
The end of the wire wrapping was anchored into the barrel o r  hole in the matrix board 
through which the multilayer board pin extended, and the pin was  then wire wrapped. 
This  pigtail penetrated the, silicone rubber of the matrix board and shorted to the adja- 
cent pin. Each AEA was rewrapped to eliminate this  potential failure mode. 
Nylon washers. - The nylon washers used to support sc rews  holding the bus ba r s  
in the AEA caused a problem. Cold flow of the nylon away from the screws  allowed 
the screws to exert  normal tension on the double bus bar  configuration and resulted in 
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shearing of the nylon insulation and short  circuiting of the two bus bar  layers. The 
nylon washers were replaced with metal washers. . 
covered on several  AEA units because of capacitive coupling between the read pulse and 
the write clock through a heat sink in the mounting multilayer board. The fall t ime of 
the read clock fell sharply in 40 nanoseconds and produced a coupling into a t ransis tor  
that generated the write clock. The memory problem occurred because the write clock 
w a s  initiated ear ly  by the falling read clock pulse. The proposed design change to 
cor rec t  this  problem consisted of increasing the bias on the write t ransis tor  from 
1.5 to 4 mill iamperes to  overcome the 2-milliampere noise f rom the read clock. In 
the course of the investigation, however, another problem appeared 40 nanoseconds 
after the read clock cutoff. The fast fall of the read clock cut off a read dr iver  so 
quickly that the back electromotive force (emf) of the stack inductance caused a t ransis-  
t o r  in the read dr iver  to  break down (30 volts applied base to emit ter)  under cold condi- 
t ions (283 K (50" F)) in which the stack uses  more current. The breakdown caused 
insertion of a pulse into the power system and triggering of the write pulse. To correct  
this  problem, the read clock fall t ime was slowed to 150 nanoseconds, and a clamp was 
placed on the write clock transistor.  
Read/write memory coupling. - An intermittent memory loss problem was dis- 
Multilayer board repairs .  - The need fo r  an approved rework procedure for multi- 
layer boards to  meet manufacturing schedule requirements became apparent ear ly  in 
the program. Haywiring was approved but was limited to five haywires per board; the 
restriction was later changed to  seven per  board. 
Glass r e s i s to r s  and diodes. - Longitudinal c racks  were found in 11 glass  r e s i s to r s  
and diodes following qualification testing. The problem was traced to low-temperature 
exposure (244 K (-20" F)) used to simulate unpackaged ground handling. The thickness 
of the conformal coating was the cause of the problem. The thicker the coating, the 
greater  the tendency for  the components to crack. The electrical character is t ics  of 
the components were unaffected. Because the lower limit of the flight environment is 
273 K (32" F) and not a factor,  a ground-handling restriction of 263 K (15" F) was 
established after testing to resolve the problem. 
Corrosion. - During a 2-week period of troubleshooting on one.AEA with the end 
plates removed and the cold rails intermittently operated, extensive internal corrosion 
developed because of moisture condensation. The gold flashing was penetrated, and 
aluminum oxide (nonconductive ) and copper hydroxide (c ond uc t ive ) d eve loped wide 1 y . 
A power supply short  circuit developed because of the conductive copper hydroxide. 
Test procedures were changed to preclude recurrence of this  problem. External AEA 
corrosion, aluminum oxide, was  also noted in the field. The areas were cleaned and 
covered with a protective coating. 
Overheating. - During vacuum chamber testing on the LM test article 8 vehicle at 
MSC, the AEA sharply overheated and had to be turned off. Extensive analysis 
revealed that the AEA mounting screws  did not f i rmly compress the AEA into the room- 
temperature  vulcanizing (RTV) resulting in  a separation of the thermal path between the 
AEA flanges and the cold rails. Because the AEA is the only box in the LM aft equip- 
ment bay with tapered coldplate flanges, special screws, which were omitted from the 
test; are only reuuired fo r  the AEA. 
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Noise, - During vehicle testing, the use of several  measurements on the AEA GSE 
connector normally unused and unconnected was impossible because of noise on the 
lines. The problem was traced to coupling in the matrix board. Several GSE lines, 
which a re  stepped down in voltage l O : l ,  were run adjacent to a 4-volt flight telemetry 
line. The noise, 0.6 volt, was found on the same lines for  several  units tested. The 
noise had been undiscovered previously because the GSE lines were not used, and the 
AEA acceptance test  only included waveform pictures of flight connector outputs. 
Waveforms of the GSE outputs of two AEA units were made to verify that the extent of 
the problem was limited to the noncritical lines measured. The noisy outputs were 
again removed from testing. 
Restarts. - Vehicle-level testing revealed that the AEA was subject to frequent 
restarts due to  power transients resulting from circuit  breaker actuations. The AEA 
was designed to shut off at  21.5 volts with a minimum transient capability of -100 volts 
for  10 microseconds, o r  an approximate 1000 volt-microseconds. The transients 
experienced in the vehicle were caused by the high internal impedance of the GSE power 
supplies used. Flight battery transients, under the same conditions, reduced the 
transients by an approximate factor of 5. Results of battery analysis determined that 
the AEA would not be shut off in flight; however, for  additional protection, the AEA 
was connected to a second 28-volt direct-current bus, and diodes were installed 
between the two buses and the AEA. Because a potential single-point failure existed if 
a short  circuit occurred a t  the AEA input that would drag  down the second bus supplying 
the PGS (i. e., the AEA circuit  breaker  to that bus would not throw in the required 
time), the second bus connection was restr ic ted from use until after a pr imary guid- 
ance failure. 
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Heat sinks. - Early in AEA production, problems encountered with bu r r s  on metal 
heat sinks required that the sinks be returned to  and reworked by the vendor. A filing 
process  was not reliable in eliminating the burrs, and a gr i t  blasting technique was 
adopted. The problem that bu r r s  can create  w a s  illustrated by an intermittent memory 
problem, which was finally traced to a heat sink bur r  that penetrated the multilayer 
board on which it was mounted and short  circuited to the f i r s t  conductive layer below. 
A restar t  of the AEA places the vehicle in attitude hold and. shuts off the engine. 
The undesirable engine-shutoff feature could not be eliminated without a hardware 
change because a flip-flop generating the off signal comes on at random when the AEA 
is energized and until memory control is established. This  problem was circumvented 
by having the crewmen augment all automatic engine-on commands with an overriding, 
manual engine-on command that a lso had other desirable features  of redundancy. 
Although a 1-volt line drop was added, the addition of the diodes provided another 
benefit in that negative transients to  the AEA were eliminated and stored power could 
not be drained. Tes t s  indicated that a 20-volt transient f rom 28 volts at the diode could 
be sustained for 560 microseconds before AEA shutoff. 
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Investigation of AEA restarts disclosed another factor potentially cr i t ical  t o  AEA 
operation. The AEA normal current  drain is 4 amperes, but 20 milliseconds after 
turn-on, when the memory is energized, an 8-ampere drain occurs  for  10 milliseconds. 
A situation could occur, if the voltage did not r ise above the AEA turn-on threshold of 
23.5 volts, in which the voltage drop produced by the memory turn-on could shut the 
AEA off and thus result  in a cycling operation that could preclude operation and destroy 
the memory. The requirement that the bus voltage be 26.2 volts at AEA turn-on, and 
following transients, was satisfied by the use of batteries. A vehicle bus a la rm occurs  
at 26. 5 volts. 
Activation. - Operation of the AEA is controlled by an "off/standby/operate" 
switch in addition to a 28-volt circuit  breaker.  In the off and standby modes, a signal 
ground is returned to  the AEA, and only a secondary AEA power supply is in operation 
to supply clock pulses to the ASA. Removal of the ground re turn  places the AEA in 
operation. The break-before-make control switch, however, causes  the AEA to go into 
operate momentarily between the off and standby switch positions. Contact bounce also 
produces the same effect. No detrimental effects were found in the use and special 
testing of the switch operation, although a power supply sequencing analysis indicated 
that the operation was undesirable fo r  memory operation. An activation and deactiva- 
tion workaround that resulted in opening the AEA circuit breaker  during switch opera- 
tion between off and standby was adopted. 
Alinement transients.  - Alinement and calibration of the AEA to the pr imary 
system is made through three AEA integrator regis ters  that  receive and s tore  pulses 
representing angular increments f rom coupling data units in the pr imary system. After 
a discharge t ime of 30 minutes, capacitor switching in the coupling data units produced 
momentary e r r o r s  as large as 0.2" to the AEA in response to angular rotations of 1.4". 
Software and pr imary system hardware changes in the AEA were not feasible within 
program constraints. A 5-minute procedure for initially t ravers ing 11.25" in each 
axis t o  close all capacitor switches was adopted for AEA IFC. Alinement of the AGS 
to  the pr imary system, done instantaneously, is performed normally with crew and 
ground monitoring of the alinement accuracy. 
Functional electronic blocks. - Functional electronic blocks, packaged combina- 
t ions of thin film networks and t ransis tors ,  were built for  the program by the AEA 
vendor. The components were initially enclosed in a hollow ceramic pack; however, 
breakage of leads, separation during vibration, and lack of seal integrity resulted in a 
redesign to  encapsulate the components in a molded pack. Fai lures  of the 96 functional 
electronic blocks in each AEA continued to  be a problem. Early fai lures  were due to  
defective t ransis tors ;  however, two other failure mechanisms emerged. Short circuit-  
ing of internal wires  to the thin film substrate and open interconnects due to spalling 
were the pr ime failure modes. The spalling, or chipping of the thin film substrate, 
was related to  the use of adhesive fo r  bonding within the functional electronic block 
(FEB). The rigidity of the adhesive, combined with the differential coefficients of 
thermal expansion of the FEB elements, produced the spalling. The spalling problem 
was corrected by the use of a different type of adhesive. The t ransis tor  type was 
changed and improved inspection procedures corrected the short  circuiting to the 
substrate. 
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Data Entry and Display Assembly Development Problems 
The following significant problems were encountered in the development of the 
DEDA. 
Clock. - During testing, the 128 OOO-pulse/sec clock from the AEA to  the DEDA 
caused DEDA malfunctions due t o  transmission line effects. A 2-microsecond clock 
pulse from the AEA t r iggers  a 2-microsecond one-shot multivibrator in the DEDA 
input circuitry. An inflection on the trailing edge of the clock pulse produced by t rans-  
mission line character is t ics  retriggered the DEDA one-shot multivibrator. The design 
correction shortened the AEA clock pulse f rom 2 microseconds to 1 microsecond. 
Electroluminescent display delamination. - Group B testing to qualify the E L  part  
lots  produced an E L  failure that appeared as hemispherical chips f rom the edges of 
the display segments. The failure was due to loss  of adhesion between the E L  conduct- 
ing film and the glass  surface. Low-temperature exposure caused the separation. 
The E L  display was tested to  a temperature of 225 K (-55" F) as part  of the group B 
testing. No delamination was seen in the qualification unit that was exposed to a tem- 
perature of 244 K (-20" F), which was well below that of the flight environment. The 
suspect lot was pulled, and no further corrective action was taken other than inspecting 
all DEDA units for s imilar  discrepancies. 
Electroluminescent display mounting. - A series of problems was encountered in 
mounting the E L  display. A rubber gasket was initially placed over the E L  display, 
and the display was forced against the front panel by a bracket. During vibration, the 
E L  glass face cracked. In the second design, the E L  display was bonded to a bracket 
that held the display away from the front panel. During qualification, the bond line 
between the bracket and the E L  display cracked because of a difference in thermal  
expansion between the aluminum bracket and the Kovar of the E L  display. (Kovar is 
necessary to match the thermal expansion of glass. ) The bonding epoxy, selected 
because of the expansion difference, was too thin in the cracked area. In addition, the 
E L  display short  circuited because of separation of the soluthane encapsulant f rom the 
back of the E L  panel, allowing salt water to  reach the connection pins. The corrective 
action was to  control the epoxy thickness bonding the E L  to the mounting bracket to 
greater  than 0.013 centimeter (0.005 inch), to place silicone rubber between the E L  
display and the front panel to  form a gasket, to place silicone rubber on the s ides  and 
rear of the E L  over the soluthane, and to remachine the front panel to eliminate any 
possibility of the E L  display touching the panel. 
Electroluminescent display. - During qualification, six E L  segments failed during 
a 4-hour period. The cause of failure was t raced to  a contaminant between the pr imary 
and secondary electrodes of the segments. The electrodes are deposited in sheets. 
The failure mode was a series of minute thermal  explosions that blasted holes in the 
electrodes until the line of connection between the two was broken to cause an open 
circuit. The contaminant originated from an epoxy mound between the centers  of the 
two overlapping electrode sheets used to support a bridging element that supplied power 
to the secondary electrode. In the silk-screening process  for  this  lot of displays, 
initial misplacement of the screen necessitated removal and replacement of the epoxy, 
which resulted in smearing and a contaminant film. 
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Another E L  display problem encountered in qualification was darkening of the 
segments because of a leak in the hermetically sealed display. The leak was caused 
by rework that stripped RTV f rom a pinhole in  the solder seal. When power was 
applied, the moisture introduced caused an electrolysis effect that allowed zinc from 
zinc sulfide in  an internal bonder to deposit around the phosphor. Darkening was 
immediate. Acceptance testing and normal operation were determined to  be an ade- 
quate screen fo r  leaks in the E L  display. 
Switches. - The DEDA switches activated by each pushbutton are of the two-pole, 
double-throw type. Both contacts must close in the numeric pushbutton switches fo r  
activation; but in such functions as clear ,  enter, and readout, one switch activates the 
DEDA and the other the AEA. This  configuration was chosen for  ground isolation. 
Because the switches must throw simultaneously (within 30 milliseconds) to prevent 
illumination of an "operator e r ro r "  light, close tolerances were necessary in manufac- 
turing. Microswitch pa i rs  were selected initially and adjusted after installation to 
throw within *O. 0063 centimeter (*O. 0025 inch). The electrical actuation was then 
determined not to vary more than 5 milliseconds. 
An anomaly during the LM-3 flight occurred when the pushbutton switch for  clear 
operated intermittently because the AEA did not receive the discrete  signal. For  sub- 
sequent flights, a wiring change was made t o  the pushbutton switches fo r  hold, enter,  
readout, and clear so that if e i ther  switch contact closed, both assemblies would 
receive the signal. This  change introduced EM1 problems, however, in that the DEDA 
became susceptible to  coupled noise transients on the l ines between the AEA and the 
DEDA. The 4-volt logic l ines were injected with as much as 6 volts of peak-to-peak 
noise when various alternating-current circuit breakers  were thrown in the spacecraft. 
The voltage d rop  caused by noise simulated pushbutton switch activation and caused the 
DEDA operator e r r o r  light to illuminate. The operational procedure of clearing the 
DEDA after these occurrences was  introduced. 
Pushbutton. - Binding of the DEDA pushbutton was  observed on two assemblies  to  
the extent that the pushbuttons would remain depressed until tapped. The problem was  
galling of the nylon pushbuttons by the stainless steel sleeve in which they rode. T o  
cor rec t  the problem, the sticky pushbuttons were removed, and the s ides  were 
smoothed. In addition, a force cri terion of 1 4  newtons (50 ounces) maximum was 
established fo r  the s ides  and corners  of the pushbutton t o  augment the center depression 
requirement of 4 to 8 newtons (15 to 30 ounces). 
Pushbutton leaks. - During vehicle thermal-vacuum tests at KSC, a phenomenon 
occurred because of leaks in the hermetically sealed DEDA pushbuttons. When the 
vacuum was broken, a pushbutton was  depressed and then returned over a period of 
time. This  condition was  caused by pressure change: the sealed bellows assembly 
was  evacuated during vacuum testing; after ambient conditions were regained, atmos- 
pheric pressure  forced depression of the pushbutton. Because the leaks were small ,  
pressurization of the bellows assembly w a s  slow. Analysis and tests confirmed that 
this  action would not take place in the mission environment of 39 985 N/m (5.8 psia). 
The DEDA vacuum acceptance test, which included a 1-hour leak test for  the hermeti-  
cally sealed DEDA, was expanded to 5 hours to detect leaking pushbuttons, and all 
field DEDA units were vacuum screened. 
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Transformers.  - Certain DEDA t ransformers  in the 4-volt supply line from the 
AEA had reversed windings. This  type t ransformer was used as an inductor, and the 
effect was to lower the phase margin of the feedback controlled loop to  4" and cause 
oscillations on the line because of the underdamped condition. The cause of the problem 
was attributed to improper workmanship in connecting the leads. The t ransformers  
were replaced. 
DEDA, the phase margin of the power output was not tested in assembly. 
Because of the split of this  power supply between the AEA and the 
"Galloping eights". - A faint, flickering background illumination of the digit 8 in 
all E L  digit windows ("galloping eights") was noticed when the E L  intensity was  maxi- 
mum in a dark room. The illumination was  not noticeable under normal lighting o r  
with lower intensity (below 115 volts to the E L  windows). The method by which the 
DEDA display is updated by the computer caused the problem. Twice-per-second data 
f rom the displayed memory location are fed serially through the data window to  the 
address  in the proper order .  The result is to produce flickering of all E L  segments as 
the data are shifted, giving the appearance of the figure 8. The possible design cor rec-  
tion was to blank the display during the period of AEA updating; however, this  cor rec-  
tion was not considered necessary because the illumination did not interfere with 
reading the DEDA, even under worst -case lighting conditions. 
Abort Guidance System Software Development Problems 
The following significant changes and problems were encountered in the develop- 
ment of AGS software. 
Memory capacity. - The selection of a 4096-word memory w a s  made with the 
knowledge that strong pressures  would exist  to  expand the memory during the program. 
In early 1966, approximately 1 year  after program inception and 3 yea r s  before flight, 
only 20 unassigned memory locations were available because of the requirements 
growth characteristic of program development. Because of skilled contractor program- 
ing and judicious selection of software functions, the mission changes were accommo- 
dated within the memory capacity. 
Radar filter. - The necessity for  performing state vector updates with radar  
information initially resulted in a simple filter effective to a range of 185 kilometers 
(100 nautical miles). The mission change to the coelliptic flight plan changed the 
accuracy requirements because of longer ranges and a reduced fuel budget. Range-rate 
information was added to the existing range computations, and, to accommodate CSM 
ranges of 741 kilometers (400 nautical miles), the radar  filter was  redesigned. 
Design mission. - The AGS hardware is evaluated against three c r i te r ia  for  selloff 
o r  after a bench calibration: ASA specification values; predicted ASA performance after 
EPC, IFC, o r  lunar surface calibration (LSC); and AGS delta-V and pericynthion per-  
formance against an abort from hover design mission. By this  means, the acceptability 
of out-of-specification ASA parameters  may be determined. 
tive design mission has  proved exceedingly difficult because contractual action is 
required to change hardware c r i te r ia  and mission definitions and techniques are 
extremely fluid. 
mission criteria will remain obsolete and that a worst-case design mission must be 
selected and fixed for hardware evaluation. 
Maintaining a representa- 
Significant changes to  each flight have demonstrated that detailed 
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Flight director attitude indicator computations sign. - A simple sign e r r o r  in the 
transformation matrix fo r  driving the flight director attitude indicator was found in 
vehicle testing and corrected. 
Direction cosine algorithm. - Interpretive computer simulations of the direction 
cosine algorithm determined that low angular rate limit-cycle conditions induced e r r o r s  
larger  than the O.a-deg/hr e r r o r  budgeted for  software. The drift  rates were  caused 
by the quantization selected to  meet the 25-deg/sec maximum angular rate and the 
constraints of an 18-bit word length. The solution was to  change progfram scaling at 
low rates to reduce the quantization e r ro r s .  The selected scaling switchover point was 
5.3 deg/sec; thus, three lower order  bits  were added below that rate. 
Hardwired memory. - The functions assigned to the hardwired half of the AEA 
memory were carefully selected to  be mission independent. Two hardwired memory 
configurations were planned; however, three became necessary.  The first memory 
configuration was  established for preproduction units at a t ime when the memory 
requirements could not be fully defined. The second configuration was to  meet all 
requirements, but the direction cosine algorithm change previously described resulted 
in a third hardwired memory for  flight units. The hardwired memory had 53 escape 
points to the erasable memory for  program patching as required. Limited use was 
made of the escape points in generating the flight program. 
External delta-V maneuver. -Orientation of the LM t o  a predicted, desired thrust  
attitude relative to a real-t ime local-horizon coordinate system became desirable. The 
capability was  added to input through the DEDA down-range, cross-range, and radial  
velocity components to be burned; have the AGS orient the vehicle to the resultant 
vector; and then rotate the vehicle to maintain the vector with respect  to local vertical. 
The VG vector is frozen in inertial  space by sensed thrust  initiation. This  mode also 
provides orbital-rate steering by using fictitious delta-V inputs that resul t  in maintain- 
ing a fixed attitude relative to the surface. 
Communication maintenance. - The necessity for  maintaining the S-band communi- 
cations locked on the Earth during powered descent and ascent required that the vehicle 
yaw angle be selectable. The equationfor the attitude e r r o r  about the body X-axis was 
changed to allow this flexibility. 
Automatic exit f rom lunar aline. - The original implementation of lunar alinement 
allowed the mode to be maintained until ascent thrust was sensed, whereupon the atti- 
tude reference would go inertial. Inaccuracies due to loss  of attitude pulse counts 
caused by the mechanism of the switchover resulted in the elimination of lunar aline- 
ment to save program steps. After the change, lunar aline was exited manually within 
4 minutes of lift-off and without significant attitude reference e r r o r s  because of lunar 
rotation. 
Attitude update. - The mission capability of the AGS was taxed as the lunar landing 
mission became more complex. A navigation performance improvement was achieved 
by updating LM altitude through the DEDA during powered descent. An update between 
610 and 2134 meters  (2000 and 7000 feet) of altitude, based on landing radar  informa- 
tinn, significantly improved navigational accuracy, even though the accuracy of the 
update was rt305 meters  (A000 feet). 
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Insertion altitude. - The requirement that the AGS achieve a 9144-meter 
(30 000 foot) clear pericynthion orbit at insertion necessitated a change in the ear ly  
concept of inserting at a 15 240-meter (50 000 foot) altitude. The insertion altitude was 
changed to 18 288 meters  (60 000 feet). Because lunar landing sites could be several  
thousand feet below the mean lunar radius, another problem developed in achieving 
pericynthion. The pericynthion requirement was changed to  be applicable to  the landing 
site radius because pericynthion occurs  near  and behind insertion. 
Program timing improvement. - Verification testing of an ear ly  flight program 
indicated that a simulation automatic t ime alarm triggered at the set  value of 
19.5 milliseconds. Because the maximum execution t ime allowable in a branch is 
20 milliseconds, a computational segment was moved to a less crit ical  branch. 
Abort/abort-stage steering constraint. - As originally programed, presence of 
I the abort o r  abort-stage discrete  command was necessary for  guidance steering. 
Because arming of the engines was  produced by this  action, even when RCS maneuvers 
were to be performed, the abort/abort-stage constraints on steering were removed. 
Lunar module state vector initialization. - A mission procedure that was  adopted 
to  improve AGS accuracy was that of inserting a canned LM state vector, representative 
of LM conditions after landing, into the AEA before powered descent. On landing, the 
LM state vector w a s  initialized by DEDA so that ear ly  aborts  on AGS would benefit from 
improved navigation. 
Insertion targeting. - The original insertion targeting was  based on a direct  t rans-  
fer trajectory to the CSM o r  on placement of the LM in a parking orbit of insertion alti- 
tude. This concept was changed to  insertion target conditions of altitude, radial  
velocity, and horizontal velocity. These targets  were revised to injection altitude, 
injection altitude rate, and orbit semimajor axis definition. Variable insertion target- 
ing was later introduced to automatically change the orbit  at  insertion based on the CSM 
phase angle. ' 
Lunar surface calibration. - The equations for  lunar surface gyro calibration were 
initially simplified so that the inertial  Y-axis was  assumed to  be within 10" of parallel  
with the lunar poles. With the adoption of inclined lunar orbi ts  and landing sites off 
the lunar equator, e r r o r s  were necessarily built up assuming all lunar rotation about 
the Y-axis. Three components of lunar rate compensation were added to  replace the 
one required initially. 
Angle to local horizontal. - During the LM-4 flight, the crewmen noted a discrep- 
ancy between the PGS and the AGS in that the angle between the Z-ax i s  and the local 
horizontal calculated by the two systems disagreed. The AGS had computed the in-plane 
projection of the Z-axis  and the local horizontal, whereas the pr imary system calcula- 
ted the actual angle. The AGS in-plane calculation was implemented to facilitate char t  
rendezvous solutions. Because the crewmen could recognize the difference, a change 
was not made to cor rec t  the calculation. 
Apofocus and perifocus. - The desirability of supplying the crewmen with more 
trajectory information than originally planned became evident. A change was instituted 
that would provide apofocus altitude &d t ime until perifocus to complement the avail- 
able perifocus altitude. 
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Constant differential height maneuver. - To increase rendezvous flexibility, a 
change was made to enable performance of the CDH maneuver at either the first or  
third apsidal crossing, ra ther  than only at the first crossing. 
Out-of-plane maneuvers. - For increased mission flexibility, performance of 
out-of-plane maneuvers at CSI and CDH to  set  up in-plane rendezvous became desirable. 
To provide this  capability, the CSI and CDH calculations were expanded. 
Node af ter  terminal  phase initiate. - The direct transfer resulting from T P I  was  
augmented by having the TPI maneuver create  a node 90" down range. This  maneuver 
allowed fo r  performing a midcourse correction at the node to place the LM and the 
CSM in the same orbit  plane fo r  the remainder of the rendezvous. 
The AGS/PGNCS mechanical misalinement. - Because the cr i t ical  alinement of 
the ASA and the PGS was controlled by mechanical interfaces, no hardware adjustment 
capability was provided. Alinement correction provisions were included originally in 
the software; however, because optical and accelerometer output alinement readings 
confirmed the integrity of the mechanical interface, the provision was deleted to  obtain 
the memory locations. Similarly, a rendezvous r ada r  boresight alinement compensa- 
tion provision was deleted. 
Radial jerk. - To eliminate excessive vehicle maneuvers during powered ascent, ... a steering constraint was  implemented by limiting radial  jerk 
The narrow limits imposed on 
achieve the desired insertion conditions from a wide range of trajectory perturbations. 
A decision was made to allow larger  off-nominal conditions to be removed when suffi- 
cient fuel was available. The ' E '  computations were revised to make the l imits  on 
r in the computations. ... r , however, reduced the capability of the LM to  
... r a function of vehicle configuration and thrust magnitude. 
Simulated flight. - During a simulated lunar ascent performed as part  of vehicle 
checkout, an out-of-plane inertial  velocity of 1 . 5  m/sec (5 ft/sec) was recorded, 
although body axis velocity did not record the out-of-plane component. The problem 
was traced to  roundoff following transformation of the compensated sensed velocity 
f rom body to  inertial  coordinates in the 20-millisecond computing cycle. For  simulated 
flight testing of the AGS, an accelerometer calibration was performed to  compensate fo r  
accelerometer  bias and input "gravity. '* The compensation is added to the accelerom- 
eter output data  every 20 milliseconds, and the resulting compensated velocity is t rans-  
formed to  inertial  coordinates, rounded, and rescaled. The e r r o r  buildup resulted 
when the compensation, because of the particular value required for  this  vehicle orien- 
tation and accelerometer bias, was consistently rounded down in computation periods 
when an accelerometer pulse was not present. The flight effects in a dynamic environ- 
ment were negligible. To  cor rec t  this problem, the effect of static roundoff e r r o r  was  
calculated and included in test resul t  evaluations. 
Capability Estimate 
Statistical summar ies  of measured AGS performance and e r r o r  models for AGS 
evaluation are given in tables  VI1 to X. The data were  generated Ii'uiii ensembk 
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information from 18 systems for 2 years.  The e r r o r  models defined the AGS perform- 
ance in the lunar mission after bench preinstallation calibration (PIC), EPC, IFC, and 
LSC. Time-stability periods used were 60 days f o r  PIC, 18 days f o r  EPC, and 3 days 
for  IFC and LSC. 
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TABLE VII. - ABORT GUIDANCE SYSTEM ERROR MODEL I CAPABILITY  ESTIMATE^ 
Gyro SA mass unbalance 
(uncorrelated) 
I I I I 
X deg/hr/g NA 0.73 
Error source 1 Axis I Unit I Mean I Gau;:ian 
I I I I 1 1 deg/hr 1 :b Gyro static drift ra te  
dynamic drift rate NA 
NA 
uwor  r elat ed 
Gyro powered descent d e g h  
0. 52 
.53 
.53  
0.48 
.30 
.43 
I I 
Gyro powered ascent dynamic 
drift ra te  
Gyro coasting ascent dynamic 
drift ra te  NA NA 
NA NA 
Gyro drift mass  unbalance 1 X 1 deg/hr [ NA 1 NA 
(correlated) 
Accelerometer bias, nonlinearity, X ug NA 190 
and vibration-induced er rorC 1 3: 1 1 ",", 1 ii: 
Gyro attitude scale-factor 
uncertainty 
310 x los6 
Accelerometer scale-factor e r r o r  I 1 g/g I :: X 10-61 65 X10-6  
65 
Gyro IA misalinement X, Y arc-sec NA 135 I Z,  Y 1 I NA I 178 
Accelerometer IA misalinement Y, X arc-sec 1 z,  x 1 1 :2 1 l: 
Initial attitude alinement e r r o r  1 ; I arc-mini  NA 
NA 
NA 
7.57 
7. 57 
7.57 
Uniform 
max. value 
_ _  
io. 37 _ _  
io. 07 
i. 07 
i. 07 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
i94 x 
i151 
i92 
NA 
NA 
NA 
aPIC calibration of X-gyro SA mass unbalance, gyro scale factor, and accelerometer 
scale factor; IFC calibration of gyro bias and accelerometer bias; PGNCS aline; abort from 
end of hover. 
bNA = not applicable. 
C Accelerometer bias, nonlinearity, and vibration-induced e r r o r  are based on IFC with 
the RCS engines firing. With the RCS engines not firing, the X, Y, and Z bias values would 
reduce to 121wg, 108pg, and 106pg, respectively. 
TABLE vm. - ABORT GUIDANCE SYSTEM ERROR MODEL II CAPABILITY E S T J M A T ~  
Axis Error source 
Gyro static drift rate 
(uncorrelated) 
Gyro powered descent 
dynamic drift rate 
Gyro powered ascent dynamic 
drift rate 
Gyro coasting ascent dynamic 
drift rate 
Gyro drift mass unbalance 
(correlated) 
Gaussian Uniform 
30 max. value Unit Mean 
Gyro SA mass unbalance I (uncorrelated) 
X 
Y 
Z 
X 
Y 
Z 
X 
Y 
Z 
Accelerometer bias, nonlinearity 
and vibration-induced error  b 
Gyro attitude scale-factor 
uncertainty 
Accelerometer scale4actor e t ror  
Gyro IA misalinement 
Accelerometer IA misalinement 
Initial attitude alinement error  
deg/hr NA 0. 70 -- 
NA .68  * O .  13 
NA . 6 8  *. 0 1  
deg/hr NA 0. 39 -- 
NA .22  *o. 33 
NA . 38 -- 
deg/hr NA 0. 50 -- 
NA . 2 7  io. 37 
NA . 4 8  -- 
X 
Y 
Z 
X 
X 
X 
Y 
Z 
X 
Y 
Z 
X 
Y 
deg/hr NA NA *O.  07 
NA NA f. 0 7  
NA NA *. 07 
deg/hr NA 0.61  NA 
deg/hr/g NA 0.57  NA 
Pg NA 190 NA 
NA 235 NA 
NA 233 NA 
deg/deg NA 310 x ~ O - ~  *94 X 
NA 310 i 1 5 1  
NA 310 i 9 2  
g/g 48X10-6 65 X10-6 NA 
48 65 NA 
X, Y 
z, y 
Y, X 
z, x 
X 
Y 
Z 
arc-8ec NA 135 NA 
NA 178 NA 
arc-sec NA 105 NA 
NA 69 NA 
arc-min NA 7. 25 NA 
NA 7. 25 NA 
NA 7. 25 NA 
PIC calibration of X-gyro SA mass unbalance, gyro scale factor, and accelerometer a 
scale factor; EPC calibration of gyro bias; IFC calibration of accelerometer bias; PGNCS 
aline; abort from end of hover. 
1kC with the 
magnitudes would reduce to 121pg, 108pg, and 106pg, respectively. 
bThe accelerometer bias, nonlinearity, and vibration-induced error  a re  based on 
engiiles fiikkg. With the RCS engines not firing, the X, Y, and Z error  
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TABLE M. - ABORT GUIDANCE SYSTEM ERROR MODEL m CAPABILITY ESTIMATE' 
Error source I 
Gyro static drift rate 
(uncorrelated) 
Gyro powered descent 
dynamic drift rate 
Gyro powered ascent dynamic 
drift rate 
Gyro coamting ascent dynamic 
drift rate 
Axis 
X 
Y 
Z 
X 
I' 
Z 
X 
Y 
Z 
X 
Y 
Z 
Gyro &rift mass unbalance 
(correlated) 
(uncorrelat ed) 
NA 
NA 
0.43 NA 
.42 NA 
.42 NA 
Initial attitude alinement e r ror  I 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
NA 
I I 
NA NA 
NA NA 
NA NA 
0.50 0 
.27 io. 37 
.48 0 
NA *O. 07 
NA f. 07 
NA f. 07 
I I I I 
d e g b  NA 0.73 NA 
s 
~ - 
Accelerometer bias, nonlinearity, 
b and vibration-induced error  
Gyro attitude scale-factor 
uncertainty 
Accelerometer scale-factor error 
Gyro IA misalinement 
Accelerometer IA misalinement 
~ 
X 
Y 
Z 
X 
Y 
Z 
X 
Y 
Z 
x, y 
z, y 
z, 21 
Y, 21 
NA 
NA 
NA 
IJ.g 
g/g I 40 X10- 
48 
NA 219 NA 
NA 259 NA 
NA 257 NA 
arc-sec 
arc-sec 
NA 
arc-min NA I x 
310 X lo-' 
310 
310 
65 X lo-' 
65 
65 
135 
178 
~ 
105 
69 
7.57 
7.57 
7.57 
*94 x10-6 
*151 I 
i92 
NA 
NA 
'PIC callbration of X-gyro SA mass unbalance, gyro scale factor, and accelerometer 
scale factor; LSC calibration of gyro bias; IFC calibration of accelerometer bias; PGNCS 
m e ;  abort from lunar surface. 
IFC with the RCS engines firing. With the RCS engines not firing, the X, Y, and Z error  
values would reduce to 128pg, 1181.18, and 116pg, respectively. 
bThe accelerometer bias, nonlinearity, and vibration-induced er ror  are based on 
TABLE x. - ABORT GUIDANCE SYSTEM ERROR MODEL IV CAPABILITY  ESTIMATE^ 
- 
Gaussian Uniform 
30 m a .  value Error source Axis Unit Mean 
Gyro static drift rate X deg/hr NA 0. 70 -- 
(uncorrelated) Y NA . 6 8  * O .  13 
Z NA . 6 8  *. 01 
dynamic drift rate Y NA . 2 2  io. 33 
Gyro powered descent X deg/hr NA 0.39  -- 
Z NA . 3 8  -- 
3 
Gyro powered ascent dynamic x d e g h  NA 0. 50 -- 
drift rate Y NA . 2 7  io. 37 
Z NA . 4 8  -- 
Gyro coasting ascent dynamic X deg/hr NA NA * O .  07 
drift rate Y NA NA f. 07 
Z NA NA f. 07 
Gyro drift mass  unbalance X d e g h r  NA 0.61  NA 
(correlated) 
(uncorrelated) 
Gyro SA mass unbalance X deg/hr/g NA 0.57  NA 
Accelerometer bias, nonlinearity, X Clg NA 163 NA 
and vibration-induced error  Y NA 163 NA 
Z NA 163 NA 
Gyro attitude scale-factor X deg/deg NA 310 x ~ O - ~  i 9 4  x10" 
uncertainty Y NA 310 i151  
Z NA 310 i 9 2  
Accelerometer scale-factor e r ror  X g/g 48 X10'6 65 x ~ O - ~  NA 
Y 48 65 NA 
Z 48 65 NA 
Gyro IA misalinement X, Y arc-sec NA 135 NA 
z, y NA 178 NA 
Accelerometer IA misalinement Y, X arc-sec NA 105 NA 
z, x NA 69 NA 
Initial attitude alinement error  X arc-min NA 7.57 NA 
Y NA 7.57 NA 
z NA 7.57 NA 
PIC calibration of X-gyro SA mass unbalance, gyro scale factor, accelerometer a 
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FI igh t Per for mance and A noma1 ie s 
Fina l  PIC Iner t ia l  i n s t rumen t  
The overall flight performance of the AGS during the first three LM missions was 
good except fo r  minor hardware malfunctions that did not interfere with mission opera- 
tions. Excellent inertial  performance exceeded specification and capability estimate 
bounds. The detailed test objectives fo r  the f i r s t  three flights were as follows. 
1. AGS in-flight calibration and performance (detailed test objective (DTO) P12.2) 
I F C  
1 2 3 
Fina l  E P C  
2. AGS/control electronics system (CES) attitude/translation control, unstaged 
LM (DTO P12.3) 
X, deg/hr . . . . .  
Y, deg /h r  . . . . .  
Z, deg/hr . . . . .  
3. AGS delta-V capability using the descent propulsion system (DTO P12.4) 
-0.27 -0.33 -0.21 -0.07 -0.19 
-.47 -. 56 -.36 - . 2 8  -.13 
-. 06 .16 . 2  0 .01 
4. AGS performance in the flight environment (DTO S12.6) 
5. AGS/CES attitude/translation control, staged LM (DTO S12.8) 
. . . . . . .  0 x, j lg e 124 - - -  
Y, pg . . . . . . .  45 - -  0 
Z )  jlg . . . . . . .  185 - -  380 
6. Unmanned, AGS-controlled ascent propulsion system burn (DTO S12.9) 
0 0 
0 0 
380 380 
7. LM AGS rendezvous evaluation (DTO S12.10) 
8. PGNCS/AGS monitor lunar orbit (DTO P20.82) 
All detailed test objectives were met after the AGS had been flown. 
The LM-3 flight (Apollo 9 mission). - The first flight test of the AGS was during 
the Apollo 9 mission (LM-3 flight). The AGS w a s  operational throughout the mission 
and controlled a descent propulsion burn. The data recorded during the AGS calibra- 
tions a re  given in table XI. 
TABLE XI. - FINAL PIC, FINAL E P C ,  AND IFC DATA O F  THE AGS 
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The AGS performance and interface specification value fo r  gyro-fixed drift  after 
IFC is 0.6 deg/hr. The resul ts  of the in-flight accelerometer calibration were below 
the DEDA quantization level fo r  Earth orbit, 380pg. The performance and interface 
specification requirement was 290pg after an IFC. The flight test results,  in a dynamic 
environment, were well within the specified value, meeting DTO P12.2 requirements. 
Data recorded during the in-flight determination of gyro and accelerometer bias  in free 
flight are given in table XII. The values were well within specification and satisfied 
the objectives of DTO S12.6. The PGNCS/AGS alinement accuracy (coupling data  unit 
(CDU) and AEA angular differences) for three alinements is given in table XIII, which 
also demonstrates the performance of DTO S12.6. The alinement accuracy specifica- 
tion was 0.067" 
Gyro 
axis 
X 
Y 
Z 
TABLE XII. - IN-FLIGHT DETERMINATION O F  GYRO AND 
Gyro drift  relation In-flight 
to the PGNCS, deg/hr accelerometer bias, pg 
0.03 * 0.12 26.8 
-.14 * .12 -43.0 
.10 + .12 -53.8 
ACCELEROMETER BIAS IN FREE FLIGHT 
? 
Axis 
X 
Y 
Z 
Alinement, deg 
1 2 3 
0 0.005 0.04 
0.02 .002 .02 
-. 003 .02 . 01 
- 
TABLE XIII. - ALINEMENT ACCURACIES 
O F  THE PGNCS DURING THE APOLLO 9 MISSION 
The performance of DTO P12.4 was demonstrated by the AGS control of the LM 
I phasing burn. The VG residual in the PGNCS after the burn was 0.42 m/sec 
~ (1.38 ft/sec!- The same residual for  the AGS was 0.3 m/sec (1.0 ft/sec). A compari-  
son of the V magnitudes for  all burns is given in table XXV. G 
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TABLE XIV. - A COMPARISON OF THE 
Velocity, m/sec (ft/sec) 
AGS PGNCS 
Burn 
- 
Docked 1.7 (5.5) 1.29 (4.24) 
Phasing .3 (1.0) .42 (1.38) 
Insertion .3 (1.0) .21 (.70) 
c SI .4 (1.5) .36 (1.18) 
VG MAGNITUDES FOR ALL BURNS 
Rendezvous maneuver 
CSI VG 
Velocity, m/sec (ft/sec) 
AGS Ground solution 
26 (86) 25 (81) 
The performance of DTO S12.10 was accomplished partly by the AGS guidance 
solutions for the rendezvous maneuver. A comparison of the AGS computed VG with 
that calculated by the ground for  the rendezvous maneuvers (table XV) showed a close 
correlation. 
TABLE XV. - A COMPARISON O F  THE RENDEZVOUS MANE W E R  
VELOCITIES AS COMPUTED BY THE AGS AND THE GROUND 
CDH VG 
T P I  VG 
13 (42) 
6.5 (21) 
12.5 (41.1) 
6.8 (22.2) 
The requirement of DTO S12.3 was satisfied by vehicle manual control during 
the LM-3 mission. The AGS performed properly in providing attitude-hold capability 
in conjunction with the CES. 
Two anomalies occurred during the Apollo 9 mission. At AGS turn-on prepara- 
tory to  the rendezvous phase, the AGS C&W light illuminated and remained on for  the 
duration of the AGS active phase. The light could be activated by an overtemperature 
ASA, by out-of-specification ASA power supply voltages, and by an AEA test mode 
failure. Because the AEA self-test readout indicated that the computer was operating 
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properly and that the ASA was at the proper temperature (322 K (120" F)) and a good 
IFC indicated that the ASA power supplies were operating properly, the mission was 
continued. Subsequent AGS performance indicated that the decision was cor rec t  and 
that the failure was not integral to the ASA. Possible causes  of the failure were an 
open line from one of three ASA power supply voltages to  instrumentation, including 
opening a 339 K (150" F) thermistor in the 12-volt line fo r  overtemperature warning; 
a short-circuited test-mode -fail t ransis tor  in the AEA; o r  several  instrumentation 
failures. The exact cause of the operator error light was not determined but was 
ascribed to an instrumentation failure. 
- 
Alinement, deg 
1 2 3 
Axis 
X 0.038 0.021 0.03 
Y .028 .005 . 01 
The second anomaly was reported by the crewmen after the mission. Frequently 
during the mission, the DEDA operator e r r o r  light would illuminate following a clearing 
operation in the readout mode. Several depressions of the pushbutton for c lear  
were required to  extinguish the light. The problem was traced by downlink information 
to failure of the AEA to get the discrete signal for clear. The pushbutton for  clear 
activates two independent microswitches adjusted to  5 milliseconds actuation, which 
supply the discrete  to  the AEA and the DEDA. If the AEA and the DEDA do not simul- 
taneously receive the discrete  signal within 30 milliseconds, an operator e r r o r  light 
results.  The failure was ascribed to  an intermittent switch operation o r  a mechanical 
shift in the switch that caused an activation timing e r r o r .  Similarly, a previous one- 
t ime anomaly in  pushbutton switch activation for  c lear  during ground testing had been 
closed as failure to fully depress  the pushbutton. 
The corrective action was to  rewire  the pushbutton switches supplying both the 
AEA and the DEDA. The pushbutton switches for clear,  enter,  readout, and hold were 
wired so that c losure of either switch would supply the discrete signal t o  both the AEA 
and the DEDA. The DEDA acceptance tes t  w a s  changed to perform pushbutton switch 
activation in six positions and during low-level vibration. 
. uti I .027 I .023 I Z 1 
The LM-4 flight (Apollo 10 mission). -During the Apollo 10 mission (LM-4 flight), 
the AGS controlled undocking, staging, ascent propulsion burn to depletion, and wide 
and narrow dead band attitude-control tests. This mission, in conjunction with the 
Apollo 9 mission, exercised all AGS functions except orbital insertion guidance and 
lunar surface operations. Three AGS alinements t o  the PGNCS that resulted in  
CDU/AEA angular differences within the 0.067" specification are given in table XVI. 
I 
TABLE XVI. - ALINEMENT ACCURACIES OF THE 
Z 
PGNCS DURING THE APOLLO 10 MISSION 
53 
A calibration of gyro and accelerometer biases was not performed during the 
mission as scheduled. The calculated performance information given in table XVTI sup- 
ports  DTO S12.6. The accelerometer bias was taken during a 20-minute period ac ross  
the phasing burn. 
TABLE XVII. - GYRO AND ACCELEROMETER CALIBRATIONS 
Bias X 
Accelerometer bias, pg . . . -56 
Gyro bias, deg/hr . . . . . -. 14 
Y Z 
6 -11 
-. 02 -. 16 
Data from four state vector t ransfers  f rom the PGNCS to the AGS provided the 
following accuracies in support of DTO S12.6: 457 meters  (1500 feet), 0.09 m/sec 
(0.3 ft/sec); 183 meters  (600 feet), 0 .2  m/sec (0.6 ft/sec); 152.5 meters  (500 feet), 
0.4 m/sec (1.3 ft/sec); and 152.5 meters  (500 feet), 0.09 m/sec (0.3 ft/sec). The 
AGS burn residuals in comparison with those of the PGNCS (table XVIII) indicated close 
agreement in support of DTO P20.82. The AGS targeted delta-V for  the TPI maneuvers 
w a s  7.39 m/sec (24.25 ft/sec). The PGNCS target was 7.3 m/sec (24.1 ft/sec). 
TABLE XVIII. - A COMPARISON OF AGS AND PGNCS 
BURN RESIDUALS 
Burn 
Phasing burn 
Insertion 
CDH 
T PI 
Velocity, m/sec (ft/sec) 
AGS 
0.6 (2) 
.33 (1.1) 
. 06 (. 21) 
.1 (. 4) 
PGNCS 
0.3 (1) 
.5 (1.7) 
.03 (.1) 
.03 (.1) 
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The burn to completion on the AGS satisfied DTO S12.9. A burn of 1164 m/sec 
(3820 ft/sec) was  performed. The largest  AGS attitude e r r o r  was 0.1". The AGS burn 
residual was 232 m/sec (762 ft/sec). The PGNCS burn residual was 233 m/sec 
(765 ft/sec). A series of AGS wide and narrow dead band attitude-hold tests was  per- 
formed after the burn to  depletion to satisfy DTO S12.8. 
X 
Y 
Z 
Two anomalies occurred during the LM-4  flight. After undocking, the crewmen 
noted a discrepancy of 20" between the AGS angle of the vehicle Z-axis with respect  t o  
local horizontal and the angle displayed by the PGNCS. This  discrepancy was caused 
by a difference in the way the angle was  calculated in the two systems. The actual 
Z-axis  was  used f o r  the PGNCS calculation, whereas a projection of the Z-axis in the 
orbital  plane w a s  used fo r  the AGS calculation. The AGS calculation had been changed 
to  the in-plane projection to  facilitate use of chart solutions. The second anomaly 
occurred at staging. A large attitude transient occurred at staging because of the AGS 
mode of control selected. The Z-axis  steering, which points the LM Z-axis at the 
CSM, had been selected previously. When the system went into the automatic mode 
near staging in wide dead band, the vehicle reoriented to  point the Z-axis at the CSM. 
Because a rate limit is not imposed in wide dead band, a rapid attitude excursion 
resulted. 
0.003 -0,005 0.02 -0.002 -0.003 
.004 ,003 -.006 -. 001 .005 
0 . 01 .002 0 .003 
The LM-5 (Apollo 11 mission) lunar landing. - No active AGS burns were per-  
formed on the Apollo 11 mission (LM-5 flight); however, AGS burn solutions were 
obtained, and AGS solutions and burn residuals were compared with those of the PGNCS. 
The accuracies  of five AGS alinements to the PGNCS are given in table XIX. Gyro-drift 
performance data  (table XX) were obtained by one IFC and two lunar surface calibra- 
t ions performed during the mission. The results were well within specification values 
and supported DTO 12.2. A graph of the gyro performance history is given in figure 4. 
TABLE XIX. - ALINEMENT ACCURACIES OF 
THE PGNCS DURING THE APOLLO 11 MISSION 
r ~~~ ~~ Alinement, deg 
h i s  I I I I I 
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TABLE XX. - GYRO-DRIFT PERFORMANCE DATA 
Calibration 
PIC (June 2, 1969) 
Final EPC (June 28, 1969) 
I F C  (July 20, 1969) 
LSC (July 20, 1969) 
LSC (July 21, 1969) 
- ASA subcontractor acceptance 
0 LM contractorlKSC 
0 LM contractorlKSC 
(Earth prelaunch calibration) 
A U-5 in-flight calibration 
0 U-5 lunar surface calibration 1 
D U-5 lunar surface calibration 2 
.- ; . i - x - 4 ,  
N 
-1 
0 40 80 120 160 2M) 240 280 
l ime, days 
I 1  I I 1  I I I I I 
1111 1211 111 211 311 411 511 611 711 811 
1968 I 1%9 
Date 
Figure 4. - Gyro bias history. 
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Drift performance, deg/hr 
X 
0.27 
.1 
.33 
.34 
.41 
Y 
0.03 
-. 13 
-. 07 
-. 08 
-. 04 
Z 
0.41 
.35 
.38 
.47 
. 5  
The accelerometer bias in free flight 
is given in table X I .  The resul ts  were 
well within specification values, supporting 
DTO 12.2. A graph of accelerometer per- 
formance history is given in figure 5. 
The AGS computation of the TPI  burn 
w a s  7.3 m/sec (24 ft/sec); the PGNCS solu- 
tion was 7.6 m/sec (25.1 f t lsec) .  The AGS- 
computed CDH maneuver was 6.17 m/sec 
(20.25 ft/sec) as compared to  a pad load of 
6 m/sec (20 ft/sec). The AGS CSI solution 
was 15.4 m/sec (50.7 ft/sec) compared to 
a nominal 15.6 m/sec (51.5 ft/sec). The 
AGS orbital parameters  after insertion were 
a 17.6- by 86.3-kilometer (9.5 by 46.6 nau- 
t ical  mile) orbit; PGNCS had a 17.6- by 
87.6-kilometer (9.5 by 47.3 nautical mile) 
orbit; and the Manned Space Flight Network 
had a 17.6- by 89.1-kilometer (9.5 by 
48.1 nautical mile) orbit. These data sup- 
port DTO S12.10 and DTO P20.82. 
TABLE XXI. - ACCELEROMETER BIAS TN FREE FLIGHT 
Calibration 
PIC (June 2, 1969) 
Free flight (July 20, 1969) 
Accelerometer bias, pg 
X Y Z 
1 -17 -66 
-60 -20 -20 
- ASA subcontractor acceptance 
0 LM contractor1KSC 
0 Free-flight data IApollo 11, LM-5) 
r 
-200 I I I I I I I 1 
2 -2001 I I I I I I J 
"r 
-200 
0 40 80 120 160 200 240 280 
Time, days 
I 1  I 1 1  I I I I ,  
1111 1211 111 211 311 411 511 611 711 811 
1968 I 1969 
Date 
Figure 5. - Ac.celerometer bias history. 
The AGS burn residuals compared 
with those of the PGNCS are given in 
table XXII. The AGS delta-Vy out-of-plane 
e r r o r  at orbital insertion was caused by a 
0.087' data  e r r o r  in azimuth supplied to the 
AGS on the lunar surface. The AGS CDH 
residuals were  0.06, -0.06, and -0.09 m/ 
sec (0.2, -0.2, and -0.3 ft/sec). The burn 
residuals support DTO S12.6. 
One AGS anomaly occurred during the 
flight. At turn-on, one of the DEDA E L  
segments would not illuminate. The seg- 
ment in the upper left of the middle data  
digit prevented the crewmen from distin- 
guishing between a 3 and a 9. Research into 
component failure his tor ies  and testing did 
not disclose any precursor  for  the failure. 
The possibility of a pinhole leak, a delam- 
ination, o r  an electrode burnout was exam- 
ined and discarded. The failure was 
ascribed to a par t  failure o r  a broken wire  
in the segment dr iver  circuit. The usage, 
population, and history of the par t s  indicated 
that the failure was an isolated case.  The 
only corrective action taken was  to  turn the 
E L  segments to full intensity briefly during 
the latter portion of the checkout flow at 
KSC . 
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TABLE XXII. - A COMPARISON OF BURN RESIDUALS 
Burn 
De scent orbit inser t  ion 
De It a - Vx 
Delta-Vy 
Delta-VZ 
Orbit insertion 
De Ita - Vx 
Delta-Vy 
Delta-VZ 
c SI 
Delta-VX 
Delta-Vy 
De Ita-V 
Re sidu a1 velocity , 
m/sec (ft/sec) 
AGS 
-0.03 (-0.1) 
-.06 (-.2) 
-.21 (-.7) 
-0.03 (-0.1) 
2.7 (8.9) 
0.1 (0.4) 
. 3  (.9) 
.09 (. 3) 
PGNCS 
0.03 (0.1) 
.l (. 4) 
.03 (. 1) 
0.03 (0.1) 
.l (. 5) 
.03 (. 1) 
-0.06 (-0.2) 
.21 (.7) 
-.03 (--1) 
PROGRAM OBSERVATIONS 
S ch ed u le 
The development of the AGS strapped-down guidance system was scheduled fo r  
completion 1 year after project initiation. Optimistically, the first preproduction units 
were originally scheduled f o r  delivery in the fall of 1965 following contractual agree- 
ment in October 1964 and program definition completion in January 1965. Some inter- 
face changes, however, were made as late as May 1965. The first unit was delivered 
in August 1966, although various design changes and recycling followed. In the develop- 
ment of a similar system, allowance of 18 months is not unrealistic. 
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Ther mal-Vacu u m Acceptance 
During the AGS program, thermal-vacuum testing screened as many failures as 
vibration testing. Both environments should be used in assembly acceptance testing, 
beginning preferably with vibration so that weaknesses found by vibration will be evi- 
dent during thermal-vacuum testing. 
Compatibility Testing 
The initial AGS deliveries were made on systems ra ther  than on individual 
assemblies. After the normal acceptance test was performed on each assembly, spe- 
cial  tests were performed with the units connected. When confidence was gained in the 
interface performance, the compatibility tes t  was dropped. No significant problems 
were disclosed by compatibility testing. Compatibility testing could be performed as 
part  of qualification o r  design-proof testing and eliminated from acceptance testing. 
Dual Source Procurement 
The procurement of cr i t ical  par t s  from two sources  was questioned during the 
initial phases of the AGS program because of the cost factor. However, numerous 
experiences in the program demonstrated the necessity of having an immediate alternate 
source of qualified par t s  to maintain a schedule-oriented program. 
Assembly Reliability 
The subcontractor satisfied the reliability goal specified for  each assembly by 
performing the most extensive part  lot screening t e s t s  ( i .e. ,  R1-level par ts  that are 
sample tested to destruction, 100-percent environmental tested, etc. ) on the most 
numerous pa r t s  in the assembly o r  on those with least usage history. Those familiar 
par ts  used in small  numbers on certain cases ,  although meeting military standard and 
program requirements, were only 100-percent electrically tested and 100-percent 
burned in (R -level parts). An element of r i sk  in this  procedure was that defective 8 
par t s  might be introduced and result  in expensive replacement. The setting of a relia- 
bility number fo r  paper analysis should be replaced by a more stringent minimum part  
lot acceptance test. 
Tran sie nt Protection 
To prevent restart ing,  a 28-volt input dropout protection of a minimum of 
1 second should be provided fo r  each assembly of an inertial  guidance system. Even 
with flight batteries of low internal impedance and excellent response characterist ics,  
the protection was needed fo r  vehicle operation with ground power supplies. The cutoff 
voltage should also be set as low as possible, preferably at 18 volts o r  below. A diode 
in the 28-volt line offered protection from negative transients and thus prevented loss  
of stored energy and increased time io hrnoff after a ;river drop, The benefits f rom a 
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1 
diode greatly exceeded the detrimental effect of the l-volt line drop it produced. The 
computer software functions and the computer electrical design fo r  startup power 
sequencing should include the requirement to accommodate immediate and automatic 
mission continuation after a power loss  that causes  a computer restart. I 
Software Development 
1 
The time required fo r  a major software change, including verification, could be 
as long as 9 months for  a full  memory that required complete recoding. A longer t ime 
w a s  required for  a hardware change. 
Memory Functions 
The memory constraints of the AEA coupled with the expanding mission require- 
ments necessitated the exclusion of many desirable software capabilities so that AGS 
rendezvous with the CSM could be retained. The provision for  in-flight dumping of the 
AEA memory was excluded, as was an in-flight loading capability. Both these functions 
are highly desirable for  future programs. Where weight requirements are not s t r in-  
gent, provision for an auxiliary memory should be included even though memory 
requirements at the t ime of hardware definition are marginal. 
S ca le-Factor Asymmetry 
For future strapped-down systems, a computer provision for  separate scale- 
factor compensations for  positive and negative rotations in each gyro channel should be 
provided. The rectification e r r o r  caused by scale-factor asymmetry in a dynamic 
environment would then be largely eliminated. 
Electroluminescent Display 
The failure of an E L  display hermetic seal and the resultant introduction of mois- 
tu re  will produce darkening of the ent i re  multidigit display within an hour. 
designs should compartmentalize each digit so  that only one will be lost if a leak occurs. 
Future 
Pu shbuttons 
The DEDA pushbutton design allowed the nylon caps to  rub against the stainless 
s teel  sleeve. In future designs, the pushbutton should be attached to  the activation 
shaft to prevent the cap f rom touching the s ides  of the housing. 
Push button Switches 
The DEDA pushbutton switches are dependent on mechanical tolerances to produce 
the simultaneous activation of two switches within a 30-millisecond time tolerance. A 
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single switch, o r  preferably a redundant switch operation, should be used in future 
designs for  pushbutton switches. 
Environmental Testing 
The effect of moisture on the assembly and the resulting corrosion could not be 
determined adequately if heat was maintained on the assembly during the test. Salt 
spray and temperature/humidity environments should be performed with the unit opera- 
tive as well as inoperative. 
Ground-Support-Equipment Heaters 
A single heating control subassembly was  used in the GSE heaters  for  both flight 
and ground temperature maintenance. Although heater life is 10 000 hours, the inoper- 
ative ASA was maintained at a temperature of 289 K (60" F) and no failures occurred. 
The necessity to  feed power into the ASA GSE connector for ground operations would 
result  in powering the vehicle bus if the ASA circuit breaker was left open. A better 
design would incorporate separate GSE heaters  to maintain inertial  instrument tempera- 
tures during inoperative periods. 
Abort Sensor Assembly Mission Acceptance 
Three levels of cr i ter ia  were used for  ASA selloff and evaluation after a bench 
calibration. The first level was comparison with specification values; the second w a s  
calculation of the stability of the bias t e r m s  after EPC, IFC, o r  LSC; and the third was 
determination of the mission delta-V and pericynthion performance. Maintaining a 
current mission definition contractually was  difficult in the extreme. To use the third 
cri terion for waiver evaluation, the only feasible procedure was to select a represent- 
ative mission and not attempt to  follow the fluctuations of mission planning. 
Abort Sensor Assembly 
After six production units of the inertial  sensor assembly have been field tested 
to  obtain ensemble data, the specification should be reevaluated and adjusted as neces- 
sary to make it conform to the capability of the system. By this  means, the specifica- 
tion could be more useful in detecting unusual performance and incipient reliability 
problems. 
Gyro Fluid 
The m a s s  unbalance shift effects ascribed to two-cut gyro fluid stratification in 
the ASA indicated that the use of a single-cut flotation fluid was preferable for  future 
programs. 
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Gyro Re sonan t Frequency 
To preclude significant induced drift  rates caused by HVSIR e r r o r s ,  the frequen- 
c ies  applied to the gyro spin and input axes by vehicle limit cycling and their  phase 
relationships should be compared with the gyro resonant frequency ear ly  in the design 
definition phase of a future program. 
Engineering Model 
Because of schedule constraints, the AGS program did not include the use of an 
engineering model for  design evaluation before committing to production. Many manu- 
facturing and circuit design problems could have been corrected ear ly  if budgetary and 
schedule constraints had permitted an engineering evaluation model. 
Assembly Cabling 
Because the LM spacecraft wiring was frozen ear ly  by rack  m'ounting connectors 
for  the subassemblies, pigtail cables were extended from the AEA. An alternative con- 
figuration that would have simplified the AEA design would have been to box mount the 
connectors and mate the spacecraft connectors to each unit. 
Vibration Transmissibil i ty 
A vibration transmissibility of 10 was initially specified fo r  all AGS assemblies.  
The AEA design required that the transmissibility be opened to  20, which was done with 
no adverse effects as proven by qualification. The use of 10-layer multilayer boards 
a t  this  transmissibility factor was therefore a lso verified. 
Split- P i  n W i re W r appi n g  
Anchoring one end of the wire wrap in the barrel produced short  circuiting to the 
next pin in the AEA. Future procedures should be corrected, as were those of the 
AEA, to eliminate pigtails on both ends of the wire wrap. 
Program I nce nti ve s 
The use of fee incentives on completion of qualification testing and deliveries of 
blocks of initial assemblies w a s  helpful in maintaining and improving schedules for  the 
AGS program. 
Capability Retention 
The staffing of capable subcontractor personnel at  a minimum cost fo r  failure 
closeout and repair  following delivery of the last unit was a significant problem because 
unless desired individuals were maintained full  t ime on the AGS program, they were 
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reassigned to  other programs and might not be recalled in an  acceptable t ime period. 
A possible solution is to require, contractually, at the inception of a major and signifi- 
cant program, that key individuals be made available on 2 weeks notice f rom production 
completion throughout the flight program. 
S u bco n t r actor Test Part i ci  pat io  n 
The initial integration of the AGS with the LM presented many problems related 
to vehicle checkout. The participation of the subcontractor would have been valuable 
during the resolution of these problems. A review by the subcontractor of vehicle 
checkout procedures and onsite support during house spacecraft integration and the test 
of the first two flight vehicles would be beneficial in future programs; such a review 
would resul t  in t ime savings that would outweigh the attendant costs. 
Program Control 
To ensure effective control of the technical and cost  aspects  of a subcontract by 
MSC subsystem personnel, the vendor change notices originated by the prime contractor 
to  the subcontractor should be reviewed by MSC, preferably before implementation. 
Cost negotiations with the prime contractor for  MSC-directed changes should also 
include subsystem technical personnel participation to ensure that the scope and the 
content of the change are properly defined in the negotiation. 
Earth-Orbi t Software Programs 
The requirement to support both Earth-orbit and lunar missions resulted in a 
decision to supply one set of equations for  both missions and to use rescaling to accom- 
modate both environments. For Earth missions, rescaling by a factor of 4 was used 
without significant performance degradation. This approach, besides the advantage of 
economy, offered verification 6f the lunar mission equations in Earth orbit. In addi- 
tion, flexibility was gained to convert a scheduled lunar mission to an Earth-orbit 
mission during flight through the use of DEDA changes to selected constants. 
Test P rog r a rn s 
The pr ime contractor was responsible for  AGS test and checkout programs, 
although the flight software was supplied as Government-furnished equipment. The 
prime contractor was required, however, to supply all test programs to the software 
vendor for  verification. In this manner, effective testing of the special programs was  
obtained to  aver t  tes t  delays and to  ensure the integrity of test results.  
Mission Performance Analysis 
Performance analyses indicating adequate delta-V margin performed ear ly  in a 
program snouia be biased io allow fo r  vzhick  wigh t  growth and the resultant reduction 
in available delta-V. 
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Gyro Rundown Time 
The use of gyro rundown time as a reliability indicator w a s  complicated in the 
ASA because the generated back emf caused all three gyros to run down in approxi- 
mately the same time. Future designs should provide fo r  decoupling the three gyro 
wheels. 
Program Evaluation Reporting Technique 
The use of the program evaluation reporting technique (PERT) was not signifi- 
cantly valuable in the AGS program. By the t ime the subcontractor PERT was  incor- 
porated into the prime contractor PERT and transmitted to MSC, the data were out of 
date. The usefulness of the PERT remained at the subcontractor facility, where it 
served as a program plan and noted existing constraints and requirements. 
Inertial Package Alinement 
A recommended addition to future strapped-down packages is an optics cube for  
alinement determination. The preinstallation ASA mounting-base alinement was  deter - 
mined by optically shooting a fixture mounted in place of the ASA against a fixture 
mounted on the vehicle navigation base and against a fixture mounted in place of the 
PGS inertial measurement unit. After installation, the mechanical alinement was 
obtained by gravity leveling the primary gimbaled system and by comparing the CDU 
readings with the ASA accelerometer outputs. The tolerance was  4 arc-minutes. This 
procedure was  adequate, but the capability fo r  direct  optical sightings should be pro- 
vided for  future systems. 
Backup Guidance Definit ion 
The crew task and training load for  operating a backup guidance system that is 
different f rom the PGS was not fully appreciated at the inception of the AGS program. 
The simple operation originally envisioned became more and more complex as the 
mission profile and the AGS software were defined. The DEDA addresses  could not 
correspond numerically to s imilar  PGS addresses ,  where applicable, because limited 
memory capacity dictated that the memory locations be assigned according to judicious 
programing rather  than according to  compatibility with the PGNCS. Every considera- 
tion in future hardware definition should be given to  placing redundancy in the primary 
system rather  than incorporating a separate and different backup guidance system. 
Nailhead Bond Capacitors 
Nailhead bond capacitors should be eliminated from future designs because of 
limited contact area between the lead and the slug. If used, 100-percent environmental 
testing and X-raying should be performed on each lot to  detect marginal bonds. 
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Flight Connector I ntegrity 
A paramount original program objective was to maintaj flight connections, once 
made. This  objective resulted in a 120-day stability requirement on ASA inertial  
parameters  because it was envisioned that no bench calibration could be made after 
beginning vehicle testing at KSC. In practice, the elimination of bench calibrations at 
KSC was not realist ic because stability must be closely observed, selection of flight 
compensation constants must be made, and the ASA can be bench calibrated during 
periods of as many as 80 days when it is not required in the vehicle for  checkout. 
During the testing of the vehicle at KSC, the ASA was calibrated three t imes  at maxi- 
mum intervals of 30 days. 
Work Packages 
The use of the work package concept for program control at the subcontractor 
level was very effective. The tracking of work units accomplished, compared to man- 
hours budgeted and actual man-hours expended, provided great  insight into both sched- 
ule and cost  forecasts.  This control procedure is highly recommended for  future 
programs. 
Elapsed-Time I ndicators and "G" Bal ls 
Neither elapsed-time indicators nor "G" balls were reliable in the AGS program. 
The timekeeping was erratic, and the "G" balls, set at 15g, were often sprung after 
hardware shipment o r  transportation from room to room. Recording accelerometers  
should be used on handling and shipping devices. Proper  packaging and handling was 
found to  be the only viable means of assuring hardware protection during transportation. 
Checkout Meetings 
Organized monthly checkout meetings at KSC were extremely beneficial in the 
AGS program. Common discussion of tes t  requirements, cr i ter ia ,  schedule, proce- 
dures ,  and problems among prime contractor, subcontractor, MSC, and KSC personnel 
was  important in ensuring the integrity of the flight vehicle. 
Computer Startup Sequence 
In designing a computer startup sequence, particular attention should be given to  
the sequence of current requirements. In the design of the AEA, the memory was 
turned on 20 milliseconds after the logic to ensure memory integrity. The normal 
4-ampere load was increased to an 8-ampere mandatory load at memory activation. 
65 
It was feasible for  the attendant line drop for  memory activation to  lower the input volt- 
age below the computer cutoff level; this practice resulted in computer on/off cycling 
for low bus voltage levels at computer turn-on. 
Operator Error  Lights 
A l l  operator e r r o r  and warning lights should be placed on GSE outputs o r  teleme- 1 
t r y  to  time correlate the occurrence of failure indications for  anomaly resolution. 
CONCLUD I NG REMARKS 
The feasibility of a strapped-down guidance system of inertial quality h a s  been 
demonstrated in the lunar module program by the abort guidance system. The number 
of problems encountered were not inordinate for a new development of this  type, and 
successful resolution of the problems resulted in remarkable performance during the 
lunar landing missions. Confidence has therefore been established in the application 
of strapped-down guidance systems for  future space programs. 
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